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1Preface
Raymond Hinnebusch
This issue examines agriculture and agrarian reform in Syria. The
first contribution by Raymond Hinnebusch surveys the
transformation of the agrarian sector under the Ba’th’s “revolution
from above” (1963-2000), arguing that this had major positive
consequences for both growth and equity in the villages. This was
the situation inherited by Bashar al-Asad in 2000. Two articles
survey the outcome, the contemporary state of Syrian agriculture.
Atieh al-Hindi gives a meticulous overview of the sector, including
its human and natural resources; particularly valuable are his
accounts of current agricultural policy and its alterations in the era of
“economic reform” and of the current state of the sector’s
production. Munther Khaddam surveys the current situation with a
focus on where improvements in under-performing areas could lead
to considerable productive increases. Both analysts pay particular
attention to the emerging water scarcities Syria faces and how they
can be addressed. Finally, Myriam Ababsa details the failure of state
farms in the Euphrates Valley, once the flagship of Syrian agrarian
socialism; she also looks at the defacto privatization of the area and
the agrarian counter-revolution which is resulting in a
reconcentration of land in the hands of many of the same rich tribal
and merchant elements that were once the target of Ba’thist agrarian
revolution.

31
The Ba'th's Agrarian Revolution
(1963-2000)
Raymond Hinnebusch
Roots of Agrarian Policy
The Ba’th's policy of rural development was driven by several
conflicting imperatives. The party came to power in 1963 committed
to an agrarian reform which would create a "socialist" agricultural
sector based on state-led development, state farms and peasant co-
operatives. Its ability to deliver a more equitable and productive
agrarian sector was a key to its legitimacy among its putative rural
constituency. More immediately, a major practical challenge was
posed by land reform implementation which, in alienating landlords
and investors who had hitherto been the source of production
requisites and investment, left a gap which the state had to fill if
production was to be sustained. When Hafiz al-Asad came to power
in 1970, he inherited an agrarian sector in stagnation: unfinished
cooperatization meant the state was failing to fill the gap. He
therefore sought to placate landlords and investors and revive the
private agricultural sector. Not only were landlords encouraged to
invest on their reduced post-land reform holdings, but the vast state
lands in the scarcely populated Jazira, on which the state lacked the
resources to either resettle peasants or create state farms, were now
rented out to agrarian entrepreneurs. Thus, the bourgeoisie, formerly
regarded as a bankrupt hostile class, was being made a partner in
agrarian development. The state, in the meantime, would concentrate
on organising the small peasant sector and reserve its investment for
the newly reclaimed and irrigated lands in major hydraulic projects
such as the Ghab and the Euphrates Basin. Agriculture would, thus,
have dual private and “socialist” sectors (ABSP 1965; 1972b).
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 However, in the seventies the exact boundaries between them
became a matter of debate among policy makers. Party apparatchiki
and Eastern Bloc-educated technocrats wanted to consolidate and
expand the socialist (state-co-operative) sector at the expense of the
market while Western-educated technocrats resisted, advocating
selective liberalisation. For several reasons, the statists recovered the
initiative in the seventies. Consolidation of small holdings through
cooperatization was essential to prevent their absorption by a
resurgent bourgeoisie and a consequent loss of the regime’s political
base to a still powerful and rival social force. Public sector import
substitute industrialisation required state control over agricultural
raw materials such as cotton while the state's provision of basic
foodstuffs to its urban constituency required state marketing of
grains. Party officials, impressed by the supposed aim of Western
states to use a "food weapon" to counter the Arab oil weapon, sought
the control over planting decisions that would give food self-
sufficiency.
In addition, party apparatchiki and ministerial bureaucrats were
acquiring a stake in the expanding new agrarian bureaucracy. The
institutionalisation of ideology in the party was unmistakable in the
constancy with which it pushed socialist-like solutions in agriculture,
particularly cooperatization, and in its abiding distrust for private
sector "feudalists'' and merchants. As recently as the 1985 Eighth
Regional Congress, the Regional Command's Peasant Office pushed
to have production co-operatives set up on newly irrigated land in the
Euphrates valley, continued to promote the expansion of state
marketing into new fields such as fruits and vegetables, and proposed
fixing the prices of machine services and transport in agriculture
instead of leaving them to the free market (Hinnebusch 1989: 41-2;
Munathama 1975; ABSP 1975: 37-50).
The etatist drive generated resistance. Peasants sometimes
evaded the state crop rotation plan. States farms were failing and
could not be used to replace private investors on the dry lands in the
Jazira. In the Euphrates Basin, the state was pouring enormous
investments into hydraulic projects, where returns were slow and
meagre. By the eighties, resource constraints were empowering
liberals who wanted to subordinate ideology to economic
practicality. They won a watershed victory when state-private joint
ventures were approved in agriculture which, in effect, meant turning
state lands over to investors on a permanent basis. Given the division
among state elites, the agrarian bourgeoisie and the peasants could
use the regime's need for investment and cooperation to blunt further
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bureaucratic intervention made in the name of agrarian socialism
(Hinnebusch 1989: 42-48; Musallim 1983: 104-05).
 No decisive choice between state and private strategies was ever
made: rather, a mix of state, co-operative and private tenure forms
crystallised. Agrarian policy expressed a pragmatic "muddling
through," zigzagging under the competitive influence of statists and
liberalizers, peasant and bourgeoisie. Yet, in defending a co-
operative and state agricultural sector, the regime continued to block
the bourgeoisie from reasserting control over the bulk of the agrarian
surplus which in part was retained by the peasantry, in part extracted
by the state itself. This was the situation inherited by Bashar al-Asad
in 2000.
Bureaucracy and Agrarian Development
The agricultural development strategy of the Hafiz regime was at
heart bureaucratic. It would be supervised by technocrats and co-
ordinated through planning from above; if there was a problem or a
need, a new ministry or "general organisation'' was created to deal
with it.
 State planning was to translate the party's goals into concrete
policies and programs. The Higher Planning Council, an inter-
ministerial body headed by the Prime Minister, was backed by
technocrats in the State Planning Commission, who drew up a state
investment plan, identifying projects and allocating budgets. It
attempted, often unsuccessfully, to co-ordinate the proposals of the
various arms of the bureaucracy, each of which sought to expand its
jurisdictions and programs. In practice, projects were sometimes
added to the plan by a powerful minister or party politician without
benefit of any feasibility study--especially in the mid-seventies when
the rival arms of the state apparatus were scrambling to claim a
chunk of the Arab oil wealth pouring in; for example, a paper pulp
factory in Deir ez-Zor imposed by the Ministry of Industry against
the opposition of the Planning Minister became an expensive white
elephant. And the party apparatus promoted ideologically inspired
but costly projects, such as the Euphrates Basin land reclamation
project, showpiece of Ba'thist agrarian socialism (Hinnebusch 1989:
48-60; Arudki 1972: 171-78: Keilany 1980).
 Although the investment plan was legally binding in theory, in
practice, ministries regularly fell well short of their targets partly
because of unrealistic goals, partly due to technical problems such as
the gypsum encountered in the Euphrates basin; or owing to
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shortfalls in Arab financial assistance caused by political conflicts; or
because of bureaucratic malcoordination or contractor
mismanagement. In the absence of sufficient data and expert
analysis, follow-up sessions of the Higher Planning Council typically
failed to pinpoint responsibility for failures and degenerated into
efforts by officials to defend their ministries (Hinnebusch 1989: 53-
56).
 Planners also produced an agricultural production plan which
set targets for key crops, crop rotations tailored to various regions,
and the levels of inputs and credit needed to reach these targets. The
plan was enforced through price policy (raising or lowering of state
purchasing prices for crops), linkage of state credit to crop delivery
and by licensing of farmers. To cultivators, the production plan was
often an unwelcome constraint which put the "needs" of the country
as projected by planners over their wishes and which they sometimes
sought to evade (Hinnebusch 1989: 51-3).
 Responsibility for implementation of the production plan was
fragmented. While the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform
(MAAR) was in charge of agricultural production, the Agricultural
Bank, and crop export agencies such as the cotton marketing agency
were subordinated to the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade,
while the Ministry of Internal Trade regulated market prices for
agricultural goods and the Ministry of Industry controlled the food,
textile, and sugar firms which bought and processed crops as well as
the industries which produced farming inputs such as fertilisers.
 Co-ordination was supposed to be achieved through the Higher
Agricultural Council (HAC), a body chaired by the Prime Minister
and including the heads of these agencies. Often, however, "each
ministry acts as if it were an independent interest in conflict with the
others," frustrating co-ordination of the several functions which had
to be done simultaneously "since delay in the performance of one
leads to a chain of bottlenecks in the performance of others" (Hilan
1973: 113).
 The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, central to
day to day implementation of agricultural policy among farmers,
suffered from endemic weaknesses, beginning with leadership.
Ministers were often either politicos lacking qualifications or had
overly short tenures; as such, the Ministry was led by a handful of
permanent deputy ministers having either political clout or
agronomic expertise. The Ministry was run with far too little
delegation of power, overburdening the minister and his deputies, to
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whom 29 department heads reported: decision-making was therefore
sluggish and initiative by subordinates discouraged.
 Mission performance was also enervated by corruption, a
submerged struggle between rival clientalist coalitions of high
officials and supplier agents over control of the contracts and the
commissions at stake in it. When commissions dictated the choice of
projects, cost-benefit rationality was sacrificed. Licenses to export
livestock to the lucrative markets in the Gulf or to import agricultural
machinery and the right to rent extensive state lands at low prices
were prized plums which agricultural authorities could distribute to
clients.
 Low salaries, especially in senior positions, encouraged
corruption, a brain drain, and an obsession with bonuses and
allowances which depended on individual connections. Inflation,
reducing the real salaries of senior ministry officials by 64% from
1974 to 1979 and further in the mid-eighties, was the major threat to
the integrity of the public service. The irony is that the government's
deficit financing contributed to the inflation which debilitated its own
capabilities.
 Reflective of its ambitious mission, the ministry had a complex
division of labour. Its multiple departments included budgeting,
accounting, contracts, personnel matters, planning & statistics,
agricultural input delivery, plant protection, research, quality control,
marketing, agricultural extension, agricultural secondary schools,
animal husbandry, range management, and agricultural machinery.
At the governorate (muhafazat) level, an agricultural director (mudir
zira`i) on the staff of the governor co-ordinated field offices
corresponding to certain of these central departments. His staff
agronomists were supposed to be specialists consulted by
agronomists working in the field; but there was too little
communication between agronomists at various levels. Too many
were mere "protectors of the rules'' rather than expediters of task
performance, and technical experts devoted much of their time to
enforcing regulations. There was insufficient housing and transport
to keep local-level agronomists mobile and in the field. There was
also a severe scarcity of technically competent personnel: the
university agronomy faculty did not attract the very brightest
students, faculties and facilities were inadequate, and training
provided little practical experience; farmers often discovered they
knew more than the recent agronomy graduates sent to instruct them
(Hinnebusch 1989: 76-86: Arudki 1972: 234-36; Musallim 1983:
145-49). Thus, the efficiency of the state apparatus failed to keep
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pace with its functional and structural expansion. Remarkably, it
nevertheless achieved, although at significant cost and after
substantial delay, many of its major objectives.
Agrarian Policy in Action
Land Reform
The centrepiece of the Ba'th's agrarian project was land reform,
which it took two decades to complete but otherwise carried out with
reasonable success. First begun under the UAR, albeit under a
Ba'thist Ministry of Land Reform and briefly reversed under the
separatist regime, it was sharply accelerated under the radical Ba'th.
Land re-distribution was largely finished by 1970 although co-
operatization would not be fully completed until the end of the
seventies. The reform radically transformed agrarian structure: it
much reduced the great estates, checked the forced proletarianization
of the peasantry which had threatened village life, and broadened and
consolidated the small holding sector. The outcome was a mixed
small peasant and medium capitalist agrarian structure.
 Table 1.1 gives a very rough indication of the impact of the land
reform on land distribution.
Table 1.1 Pre- and post-reform agrarian structure
        Pre-Reform      Post-Reform
        land surface       land surface
         % owned   % pop.  % owned  % populated
Large (100+)  1.0  50.0       0.5 17.7
Medium (10-100) 9.0  37.0       15.3  58.7
Small (-10)   30.0  13.0 48.0  23.6
Landless    60.0 0.0 36.1 0.0
Source: Hinnebusch 1989
But data taking account of differences between irrigated and non-
irrigated holdings allows a more precise adumbration of agrarian
stratification at the completion of the reform (Hinnebusch 1989: 112-
116). This more complex picture presents the following features:
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1. At the top of the agrarian social structure the big landlords and
entrepreneur-rentiers, about 1% of holders, still controlled a fifth of
the land. However, the land reform accelerated their transformation
from pre-capitalist "feudalists" into agrarian capitalists. To maintain
their incomes on reduced holdings, formerly absentee landlords
started to invest in advanced technology, such as sprinkler irrigation,
improved seeds and mechanised harvesters. Thus, the reform resulted
in the replacement of large but extensively cultivated estates with
smaller but more intensely cultivated capitalist farms.
 2. Below the larger landlords was a thin stratum of "rich peasants"
and, around the large cities, urban investors making up barely 3% of
holders, which controlled more than 10% of the surface. They might
be manager-cultivators hiring labour, or might rent or let their land
out to a sharecropper. While big landlords, rich peasants, and urban
investors together made up only about 4% of holders, they controlled
almost a third of the land and 37% of all agricultural machinery in
1970.
 3. Below them was a relatively secure, prosperous and
entrepreneurial middle peasant stratum amounting to over a third of
all owners and commanding a half of the land surface. These self-
sufficient middle peasants (owning 2-10 hectares (ha.) irrigated or
10-50 ha. dry land and not employing the labour of others except
seasonally) could avoid off-farm work and had the resources for land
improvement.
 4. Next down were small peasants, representing nearly 62% of
owners but controlling only 18.2% of the agricultural surface. The
better off upper half of this stratum (peasant owners of over 1 ha.
irrigated, 3 ha. rainfed land), had a strong personal attachment to the
land, some independence and lived a decent peasant life. They were,
however, unlikely to be very prosperous, individually they lacked the
resources to much increase production and, under-employed, they or
their sons might leave the land at least temporarily to accumulate
some petty capital. The poorer half of the small peasants (owners
with less than 1 irrigated or 3 rainfed hectares) were compelled to
seek supplementary off-farm income.
 5. At the bottom of the stratification system were the "landless:"
tenants, sharecroppers and wage workers. Most renters and
sharecroppers received about half of the income that a landowning
family would receive on an equivalent size farm, so the average
tenant probably ranked with the poorer stratum of the peasantry.
They also often lacked the resources and motivation to improve their
holdings. Finally, the low income and insecurity of agricultural wage
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workers put them at the very bottom of the agrarian structure, earning
a third to a half of the income of small holders in the seventies.
 In eschewing a more thorough equalisation of land holdings and
permitting the preservation of medium-sized estates, the regime
failed to make enough land available to wipe out landlessness and
consolidate a secure small peasantry. The stark fact was that, even
after land reform, if landless agricultural workers, tenants,
sharecroppers, and peasant holders with so little land that they could
not support themselves on it without supplementary work are added
together, these poor peasants made up about half of Syria's peasantry
in 1970. Poverty remained a fact of life in the post-reform Syrian
village (Hinnebusch 1989: 116).
 But agrarian reform did consolidate, between the richest and
poorest peasants, a stratum made up of middle peasants and the
viable half of the small holders, who together constituted about two-
thirds of land holders and about two-fifths of the agrarian population.
This stratum's control of around 60% of the land arguably made it the
strongest social force in rural Syria, replacing the once dominant
landed magnates. These, as well as poorer peasants were, moreover,
incorporated into state supported co-operatives. By 1981, over two-
thirds of the agriculturally-dependent rural population or between
seventy and eighty percent of all eligible holders (those owning no
more than 8 ha. irrigated and 30 ha. non-irrigated land, plus
sharecroppers and renters) and by 1983 about 85% of all peasant
families (including wage labourers) were at least nominally in co-
operatives (Hinnebusch 1989: 177). This was of no little
consequence for the political economy of the regime: as against
claims that the Ba'th merely represented the rich peasantry, this data
suggests it consolidated a political base among Syria's substantial
mainstream middle peasantry.
Co-operatives
It was the co-operatives and the agrarian bureaucracy linking them to
the state which made land reform viable. Co-operatives provided the
framework by which the state delivered production loans and
agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilisers), services (mechanised plowing
and harvesting, crop protection) and innovation to small holders,
while also imposing the agricultural plan and the facilitating the
compulsory sale of strategic crops to the state. This system gradually
replaced the landlords and money lenders who had formerly lived off
“empires” of peasant debtors or used foreclosure on debt to acquire
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ownership of small holdings. In delivering services and blocking
such land reconcentration, the co-operatives stabilised the small
holding sector. By facilitating state marketing of crops, they
excluded landlords and merchants from mechanisms of surplus
extraction and capital accumulation, but, by contrast to many other
similar regimes, state marketing in Syria was not generally used by
the regime to extract a surplus from peasants and indeed provided
them with stable support prices.
 While the co-operatives made the small sector reasonably
productive, they failed to realise the ideals of socialist agriculture: to
organise the collective investment and common production processes
thought needed by the regime to overcome land fragmentation.
Peasants lacked enough confidence in the co-operatives to cede
individual management of their land, partly because family rivalries
destroyed trust, partly because of the government's use of the co-
operatives as instruments of control: for enforcing crop rotations and
for imposing collective responsibility for credit repayment. As such,
the co-operatives provided no "socialist" alternative to capitalist
mechanisms of accumulation and investment. However, they did
encourage entrepreneurship among middle peasants and were
arguably generators of a petty peasant capitalism. They were,
moreover, supplemented by an array of supportive bureaucratic
organisations created to carry out specialised policy tasks, including
the Ghab and Euphrates Basin administrations, the General
Organisations for promoting production of cattle, poultry, and fish,
and similar bureaucracies for the delivery of fodder and of seeds and
for the spread of agricultural mechanisation. These organisations
filled some of the gap left by the entrepreneurial inertia of many co-
operatives (Bakhour & Sabbagh 1979; Hinnebusch 1989: 147-63,
171-206; Bianquis 1979; Juma 1972; Metral 1984).
Bureaucratic Performance, Socio-economic Outcomes
Aside from land reform, the performance of the state agricultural
bureaucracy was mixed: it contributed to increased production and
productivity but often at considerable cost in waste and inefficiency.
The production plan reduced unnecessary fallow, stabilised wheat
output by concentrating it in good rainfall areas and diversified the
crop mix. The state's planning, credit, and input system advanced the
regime's control over production of strategic crops, notably cotton,
sugar beets and wheat, essential for export earnings, agro-industry
and food security, while also guaranteeing producers stable, if not
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exactly lucrative markets. But state marketing agencies seemed
incapable of effectively organising the delivery of fruits and
vegetables to public processing factories. The Ministry of
Agriculture initiated a score of useful innovations, from
orchardization to seed and animal improvement, advancing
agricultural intensification and mechanisation with considerable
success, although the dismal performance of the research and
extension apparatus prevented the derivation of maximum benefit
from this effort (Hinnebusch 1989: 123-170).
 Major resources were invested in land reclamation and irrigation
although this effort, as well, was plagued by considerable waste and
inefficiency. The Ghab irrigation project, long "sick" from
incompetent state management, finally transformed an area of
desolation and urban dominance into a viable peasant community
with a certain prosperity (Metral 1984). The much more ambitious
Euphrates project was, in an arid country which has reached the
limits of extensive expansion, a natural next step in agricultural
development and could reproduce the Ghab outcome. But it has been
a costly drain on the state's limited resources and a strain on its
modest management capacities. The state's massive investment in
irrigation and reclamation did not decisively relieve Syrian
agriculture of its crippling dependence on unreliable rainfall, in large
part because advances in irrigation were partly cancelled out by
increased salinity owing to inadequate drainage. But it consolidated
and gradually expanded the irrigated sector (Sainsaulieu 1986;
Hinnebusch 1989: 207-252).
  Land reform, cooperatization and state intervention in
agriculture had several positive social and economic consequences.
Land reform, in enhancing the independence and potential for
initiative among middle and viable small holders while forcing
greater investment by landlords on their reduced holdings, created an
agrarian structure more conducive to sustained growth than the old
one and at the cost of only temporary declines in production during
the implementation process. The co-operatives provided crucial
support to land reform beneficiaries and peasants generally. The
state's delivery of services, credit, and investments in irrigation and
land reclamation probably put more resources into agriculture than it
extracted. The public sector also developed sectoral interchanges
which stimulated agriculture: industry provided inputs, markets and
employment opportunities while the construction sector provided
hydraulic public works and the transport infrastructure needed to
integrate village and market. Overall, state activity stimulated enough
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development to permit peasants to diversify their resources and
strategies: many, taking advantage of new opportunities for off-farm
income and of state credit and inputs acquired the resources to
significantly intensify production (Hinnebusch 1989: 294-301;
Bakhour 1984; Keilany 1980).
 As a result, there was a continuous increase in agricultural
production from the mid-seventies through the eighties. Growth in
agricultural per capita output despite a decline in the agricultural
work force indicated that agriculture was being brought to support a
growing non-agricultural population. This growth was not, however,
enough to overcome a chronic deficit in the agricultural balance of
trade. And, for better or worse, state-dominated agriculture did not
become an effective mechanism for extracting a surplus from
agriculture to sustain industrialisation. Partly for this reason, growth
in agriculture translated into a significant rise in the rural standard of
living (Hinnebusch 1989: 253-283; USDA 1980).
State and Village: The Political Consequences of Agrarian Reform
The Ba'th's drive to enhance state capabilities in agriculture generally
succeeded. Land reform demolished traditional interests resistant to
state penetration and cooperatization institutionalised state linkages
to peasants. The effect of this state intervention in the village was to
pluralize power there, breaking the former dominance of the landed
oligarchy over the peasantry and bridging the urban-rural gap which
long kept the village encapsulated and depressed. Of course, the
regime's bureaucratic penetration and regulation of agriculture had
costs for peasants. There were conflicts of interest between their
desire for independence and the bureaucracy's drive for control.
 Yet, peasants were not so powerless as before. The village had
acquired access to national power it never previously enjoyed.
Alliances between agriculture ministry bureaucrats and local party
and peasant union leaders pushed for higher producer prices.
Clientalism supplemented this corporatist interest articulation when
individuals who moved up in the national power structure used their
position to help out kin in the village. The potential for official
arbitrariness was diluted by the plurality of authorities--party,
peasant union, and ministry officials--who took decisions in
committees and by the recruitment of rurals into the local
bureaucracy. Many peasants found ways to evade, even manipulate
the state: a son would join the local party, a bribe would sway an
official; patronage was "democratised" at the local level as public
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goods were diverted and laws bent to favour locals. Finally, officials
could not afford to alienate peasants who could ultimately leave the
state/co-operative sector and opt for private patrons and markets;
indeed peasants utilised both state and private networks as it suited
their interests (Metral 1984; Hinnebusch 1976; Seurat 1979).
Conclusion
The Ba’th party, coming out of the village, initially purused an
agrarian revolution that largely benefited the rural areas and
incorporated the peasantry into national life. This consituted the
social base of Ba’thism, imparting a stability to the regime it would
otherwise have lacked. Remarkably, Ba’th agrarian policy managed
to combine greater equality with greater growth. However, unlike
either “Stalinist” or capitalist development strategies, the Ba’th
extracted little from agriculture, no industial revolution took place at
its expense and the state came to rely on rents, whether oil and aid;
yet simultaneously and partly as a result of greater rural prosperity,
social mobility and integration of rapid greater population growth
and urbanization generated the employment crisis inherited by
Bashar al-Asad. The imbalance between the Ba’thist overdeveloped
political superstructure and its economic infrastructure became
apparent; this made it vulnerable to pressures for “reform” that, in the
absence of a peasantry sufficiently mobilized and autonomous to
defend its gains, could open the door to agrarian “counter-
revolution.”
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Syria's Agricultural Sector: Situation,
Role, Challenges and Prospects
Atieh al-Hindi
Introduction
The Syrian Arab Republic lies on the eastern coast of the
Mediterranean with an area of 185,000 km2 (18.5 million ha), of
which 6 million ha. are arable land. Syria’s population was 18.7
million in 2005. Its climate is Mediterranean: rainy winters and hot
dry summers with two short transitional seasons in between.
Agriculture is one of the most important sectors of the Syrian
economy. In the mid-2000s, it accounted for 25% of the GDP, 20%
of exports and employed 20% of the workforce. Agriculture also
plays a major role in providing raw materials for manufacturing and
food industries. The last decade witnessed an obvious development
in agricultural production that led to self-sufficiency in several
products, especially wheat, legumes, cotton, vegetable, fruits, olive
and olive oil, as well as animal products. Deficits in some products
continued to exist, especially in sugar, corn, dairy products, meats
and vegetable oils (except olive oil). However, agricultural
production fluctuates since 70% of the cultivated area depends on
rainfall; at the end of the decade Syria suffered from a particularly
severe bout of drought. Land is also misused and polluted in some
regions while water resources are over-exploited in most basins.
Most agricultural ownership and investment is private. The private
sector accounts for 98.5% of total investment (in the cooperative
sector ownership is private). The joint sector and public sector
account for 1% and 0.5% respectively.
Agricultural policies have undergone several improvements on
different levels. Marketing and processing of cotton, sugar beet and
tobacco as well as wheat exports had been the monopoly of public
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institutions; now the private sector is allowed to enter production,
manufacturing and marketing. The agricultural sector has become a
relatively more open market. The recent changes stipulated in the
tenth five-year plan adopting a social market economy in addition to
signing of trade agreements will accelerate trade liberalization. Syria
applied to the WTO in 2001; WTO accession will positively affect
the macro and agricultural policy reforms.
Natural and Human Resources
Land Resources
The total area of Syria is 18.5 million ha. In 2005, land uses were as
follows: arable 32%, non-arable lands 20%, meadows and pastures
45%, and forests 3%. The actually cultivated land in 2005 amounted
to 4.7 million ha, of which 70% was rainfed and 30% irrigated. The
cultivated area increased from 5,352 thousand ha in 2000 to 5,562
thousand ha. in 2005. As a result of reclamation in rainfed and
irrigated lands, and of well drilling, the irrigated areas increased from
1,210 thousand ha to 1,425 thousand ha in the same period with a
growth rate of 3.33%, while the rainfed areas increased from 3,335
thousand ha to 3,446 thousand with a growth rate of 0.66%. Table
2.1 shows the changes in land use during 2000-2005.
Water Resources and Availability
Water Resources
The annual average volume of water is 62 billion m3, of which 45
billion m3 is rainfall and 17 billion m3 is fixed sources including
those from the Euphrates river (specified in the temporary agreement
with Turkey). The estimated net annual water resources are 14-16
billion m3 taking account of evaporation, water losses and seasonal
rainfall. Water is used in several sectors including irrigation, industry
and households. Irrigation consumes the biggest proportion (around
90%). Water resources are distributed in seven basins that differ in
size, rainfall levels and water volume. Al-Badia basin is the largest in
area (38% of the total country’s area), while the coastal Basin is the
smallest (2.8% of the total area). The Euphrates and the Khabour
basins represent the main water sources (see table 2.2).
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The inefficiency and misuse of water accompanied by drought
have resulted in significant reduction of inflow to wells and depletion
of some springs as well as low river flows. Syria’s water balance
shows an annual deficit of 3 billion m3 assuming that Syria’s share of
the Euphrates is 210 m3 per second (average discharge to Syria is 500
m3/s of which 58% flow to Iraq) which means 6.6 billion m3. Total
annual water resources in Syria are 16 billion m3, while the total use
is 19 billion m,3 resulting in the depletion of underground resources.
The main water source is surface water, of which about 7 billion
m3 is consumed, and groundwater, of which about 6 billion m3 is
consumed (Table 2.3). Irrigated areas have expanded; statistics
indicate they depend heavily on well water and other non-renewable
resources. The proportion of well-irrigated lands was 60% while
public irrigation systems covered 23% of irrigated land in 2005. The
remaining was irrigated from rivers and springs. Most areas use
traditional irrigation methods; modern techniques (sprinkler, drip) are
only used on 17% of total irrigated area. Table 2.4 shows the areas
and methods of irrigation.
Most water basins are polluted by sewage water, nitrates,
agricultural chemicals and the discharges of factories, tanneries and
oil refineries. Al-Badia basin suffers from salinity, in particular the
lands under some irrigation schemes. Per capita share of total water
resources for all purposes (drinking, industry, agriculture and others)
has dropped from 1,201.3 m3 a year in 1993 to 882.6 m3 in 2005 and
might decrease more in drought years. A water crisis is expected for
several reasons, the most important being population growth and the
increased water usage especially in recurrent drought years. This
might put water resources sustainability at risk.
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Table 2.3 Available water sources during 2000-2005 (billion m
3
)
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 ** 2005 **
Groundwater 3 3.75 4.37 6.11 5.9 5.8
Surface water 6.42 6.67 7.13 7.48 7.3 7.1
Surface and
 Ground water
9.42 10.42 11.5 13.59 13.2 12.9
Other
resources
*
3.1 3.24 3.41 3.51 3.4 3.3
Total 12.52 13.66 14.91 17.1 16.6 16.2
Source: MAAR, Status quo of the agricultural sector 1992-2003
* Sanitation water and agricultural waste water, etc.
** Preliminary estimates based on the water needs for the
agricultural plan, several issues, Public Authority for Scientific
Agricultural Research.
Table 2.4 Irrigated lands by irrigation source and method during 2002-
2005 (hectare)
Irrigated land Modern irrigation
Description
Total
irrigated
land Wells Gov.
projects
Rivers and
springs
Spray Drip Total
% of
modern
irrigation
2002 1,332,781 817,271 314,123 201,387 138,500 76,421 214,921 16.1
2003 1,361,211 854,655 289,364 217,192 133,338 52,149 185,487 13.6
2004 1,439,134 864,743 340,230 234,161 130,170 57,487 187,657 13.0
2005* 1,425,811 865,367 326,113 234,331 159,940 84,433 244,373 17.1
Annual
growth (%)
2.3 1.9 1.3 5.2 4.9 3.4 4.4 2.1
Source: MAAR, Agricultural Statistical Abstract of 2005
* Preliminary estimates
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Measures taken to enhance water availability and rationalize use
To reduce water use and depletion, and to make additional water
available, the government has taken several actions that have had a
positive impact though not up to expectations. The most important
steps are:
• Establishing small, medium and large dams all over the
country. In 2005 the total number of constructed dams was
164 with a storage capacity of 18.6 billion m
3
, of which 14
billion m
3
 are stored in the Euphrates Dam. These dams have
enhanced the efficiency of surface water use.
• Land reclamation benefiting from public irrigation systems:
20,000 ha have been reclaimed annually.
• The Public Authority for Water Resources was established
by Decree 90 of 2005 to develop the administrative
performance of government water-related institutions and to
simplify procedures.
• Water Legislation was issued to intended to encourage
introducing modern irrigation; to support sustainable
development; to stop groundwater depletion; and to organize
the relationship between citizens and the water
administration authorities.
• Law 59 of 2005 created a SYP 53-billion fund for financing
the national plan for modern irrigation, and 22 billion SYP
were allocated for this purpose in the 10
th
 FYP.
• The implementation of rain harvest projects in al-Badia to
secure water for cattle herds.
• Establishing metrological stations (water infor-
mation centers) in cooperation with Japan.
• Establishing the Higher Institute for Water Research.
• Starting to build further research centers to rehabilitate and
enhance the efficiency of irrigated areas.
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Further required measures to enhance the use and management of
irrigation water
Further measures needed to sustain water resources, regulate
their exploitation, and enhance their use can be summed up as
follows:
• Expand use of modern irrigation techniques (drip, sprinkler,
localized, subsoil) to increase water use efficiency.
• Ensure the required funding, technical assistance, extension
and institutional structures for implementation of such
irrigation methods in accordance with soil types and planting
methods.
• Improve the irrigation efficiency especially in the existing
government projects. Rehabilitate these projects using
modern techniques and design new projects using modern
technology.
• Prevent illegal well digging; settle the status of unlicensed
wells; regulate groundwater use; install flow meters on wells;
determine usage in accordance with renewability levels; and
monitor consumption.
• Control water resources pollution of all kinds (chemical,
sewage or salinity); prevent water loss through leakage and
evaporation; and prevent canals blockage by weeds.
• Establish associations or societies to insure consumers’
participation in developing irrigation programs. This will
complement the government efforts to sustain water
resources.
• Issue legislation and regulation to determine fees for
irrigation, maintenance and operation according to irrigated
area unit price in order to raise consumption efficiency.
Rural Human Resources
Syria’s population was 18,717 thousand in 2005 with an annual
growth rate of 2.78% in the period 2000-2005. Urban population
accounts for 53% against 47% of rural population in which males
represent 51% and females 49%. Urban population growth rate
amounted to 4.22% per year while the rural growth rate is 1.26%
despite the high rate of births in rural areas. This indicates a
continuation in migration from countryside to cities for better jobs
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despite the development of rural services and communications
projects. The Syrian population is young; those under 24 years old
account for 62% of the total population, which means a surge in
labor market newcomers.
Agriculture is a major job creation sector. In 2005 it ranked
second (20%) after services (27%) compared to other sectors:
industry 14%, building and construction 14%, trade and hostelry
16%, transport and communications 7% and finance, insurance and
real estates 2% (See Table 2.5). Of the 50% of women in the labor
force around 30% are employed in agriculture, making it the main
employment sector for women. Agriculture is also characterized by
family work. Official figures show a decrease in the numbers of
people working in agriculture (1,430 thousand in 2000 or 29% of
total employed population dropping to 945 thousand in 2005 or 20%
of total employed population (See table 2.6). The falling numbers of
agricultural workers would be a healthy phenomenon if it was the
result of a national plan to provide the necessary labor force for other
sectors, given that modern technologies decrease employment in
agriculture. However, indicators often show that this is not the case.
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Table 2.5 Distribution of workers by sector during 2002-2005 (%)
Public Private Cooperative
& joint
Total
Description
2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005 2002 2005
Agriculture, fishing
& forestry
2.4 2.1 36.2 26.9 47.9 18.1 30.3 20.1
Industry 9.7 7.6 11.6 15.8 12.4 14.4 13.7 13.6
Building &
construction
7.1 2.1 22.6 18.5 1.9 17.2 13.2 14.1
Trade, hostelry &
restaurants
1.3 1.0 16.2 21.2 18.4 24.8 15.0 15.8
Transport and
communications
4.0 2.9 8.5 8.6 10.4 11.1 5.5 7.1
Finance, insurance
and real estate
0.9 1.2 1.2 2.5 0.0 1.8 1.3 2.1
Services 74.7 83.1 3.7 6.5 9.0 12.6 21.0 27.2
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract, several
issues
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Table 2.6 Human resources during 2000-2005
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average
annual
growth
(%)
Total population
(in thousands)
16,320 16,720 17,130 17,550 18,138 18,717 2.78
Rural population
(in thousands)
8,177 8,344 8,531 8,744 8,433 8,704 1.26
Share of rural
population (%)
50.1 49.9 49.8 49.8 46.5 46.5 -1.48
Urban
population (in
thousands)
8,143 8,376 8,599 8,806 9,705 10,013 4.22
Share of urban
population (%)
49.9 50.1 50.2 50.2 53.5 53.5 1.40
Total workers (in
thousands)
4,937 5,275 5,459 4,821 4,302 4,693 -1.01
Agricultural
workers (in
thousands)
1,430 1,473 1,462 1,462 734 945 -7.95
Share of
agricultural
workers (%)
29.0 27.9 26.8 30.3 17.1 20.1 -7.07
Source: the database of the National Center for Agrarian Policies,
food and agriculture.
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Agricultural policies and their amendments
Agricultural policies in Syria have focused on a number of objectives
including:
• Effective contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP and
to economic stability through increased production and
employment.
• Enhanced population living standards by providing food
commodities at reasonable prices and minimizing the gap
between urban and rural areas.
• Increased self-sufficiency of major food commodities and an
improved trade balance by reducing imports and increasing
exports.
• Ensuring integration between agricultural and other sectors
(in inputs and production processes): the agricultural sector
should provide industry with the major raw inputs; and
industry should intensify the use of machinery and fertilizers
in agriculture.
Before the 1990s, agricultural policies were highly protectionist.
However, several changes took place in the early 1990s as deemed
necessary by the circumstances. The following provides a glimpse of
the most important agricultural policies and their amendments:
Planning Policies
Agricultural planning in Syria has, like economic and social
planning, witnessed several changes. Centralized planning had
regulated the investment of agricultural resources through indicative
figures. However, since the 1990s, the government planning role has
moved from setting quantitative targets to indicative planning
achieved through pricing. It has focused on: 1) setting general
indications for strategic crops (wheat, barley, cotton, sugar beet,
tobacco, chickpeas and lentils). These crops are still priced by the
government which is in turn committed to market them but prices are
compulsory only when farmers sell to state establishments; 2)
planning to ensure sufficient supply to meet local demand for food
commodities, industrial requirements of agricultural products, and a
surplus for export to earn the foreign currency needed for the
procurement of inputs that are not available locally; 3) determining
agricultural rotations and crop structures within the light of land and
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water sustainability; 4) setting the sowing calendar in each region
based on scientific research; 5) planning the provision of production
inputs in adequate quantity and on a timely basis, extension services
in the production stage and disease control measures.
Plans are to be developed in each governorate by the relevant
agricultural authorities using a bottom-up approach but guided by
national targets. In 2004, the planning policy was further amended to
give more flexibility and choice to farmers. Thus, instead of
specifying targets for each crop, a target is set for a category such as
legumes, leaving it to farmers to choose among lentil, chickpea,
broad bean, peas, etc.
Pricing Policies
Pricing policy for agricultural products has also witnessed some
changes. Prices used to be determined centrally for cereals, fodders,
industrial crops, potatoes, onions, garlic and some fruits. Pricing
policy was used as a tool to implement production plans for major
crops. Prices were based on production costs with the profit margins
defined in line with the importance of the relevant crops the
government wished to encourage.
Changes include: Prices are now administratively set only for
major crops (wheat, barley, lentil, chickpeas, maize, cotton, sugar
beet, and tobacco). Prices are considered indicative and only
compulsory when selling to government establishments. Most prices
have been frozen since 1996 in order to reduce the gap between
domestic and international prices originally instituted to encourage
production and raise farmer incomes. Only the prices of barley,
chickpea, lentils and sugar beet were raised in 2005.
Marketing Policies
Syrian marketing policies were changed in line with the general
policy amendments, and the most important aspects are: 1) ending
the compulsory delivery of agricultural products to state marketing
agencies (including major crops) except crops processed by state-
owned enterprises (cotton, sugar beet, and tobacco); the private
sector is allowed to market and process all other crops. 2) allowing
the export of agricultural products except wheat and those
monopolized by the state; 3) The public General Establishment for
Fodder distributes minimum fodder rations while the private sector is
allowed to trade in fodder both at home and abroad.
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Credit Policies
Agricultural credit in Syria is provided through the Agricultural
Cooperative Bank (ACB) under the following basic conditions:
Agricultural credits are provided only by the ACB through its
branches located in the agricultural areas (i.e. not by private
creditors). The bank provides credit in cash as well as in kind such as
production inputs. The ACB interest rates are relatively low. They
range from 4.5% for the cooperative and public sectors to 5.5% for
the private sector. This applies to all seasonal, medium and long term
credits except seasonal credits exceeding SYP 50,000 per each crop,
where the interest rate is 6% for the public and cooperative sectors
and 7.5% for the private sector. However, those rates were adjusted
to 5-8% in the beginning of 2007.
Subsidization
Over the past years, the government subsidies to production inputs
contributed to realizing good agricultural development levels,
especially in strategic crops where subsidies represented a large part
of the production costs. Subsidies promoted the use of improved
seeds and chemical fertilizers especially for wheat and cotton.
However, the government has reviewed these polices and reduced or
even eliminated such subsidies. In 1986, a resolution by the Supreme
Agricultural Council determined that the prices of locally produced
seeds should be in line with the production cost. In 1987 and later a
number of resolutions eliminated the subsidies for pesticides and
bags and decided on phasing out those of fertilizers and farming
machinery. Subsidies continued for fuel as well as for the
maintenance and operation costs in government irrigation projects,
and for the fertilizers in recent years due to the high international
prices and finally a partial subsidy remained for hard and soft wheat
seeds.
Taxes
The agricultural sector enjoys several tax exemptions, especially
production and consumer cooperatives, agricultural investments,
agricultural laborers housing, agricultural warehouses and cattle
barns. Production taxes were imposed on farming animals and on
exported products at a rate ranging from 9% to 12% of the estimated
value. Fresh, dried and frozen vegetables and fruits including their
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packaging are exempted from agricultural production taxes when
exported. Olives, olive oil and cotton and its products were exempted
from taxes in 1999. All exported agricultural products were
exempted in 2001. A recent amendment on the custom tariffs
imposed the lowest tariffs on production inputs and the highest on
luxury agricultural and consumer imports.
Exchange Policies
In the 1980s, Syria used multiple exchange rates either to subsidize
or to impose taxes on exports and imports in line with the state
economic policy. The given rationale was that the multiple rate
system was an alternative to currency depreciation; they aimed at
stabilizing the prices of imported items especially essential
commodities and medicines and production inputs without affecting
the macro demand. Since then exchange rates were modified to bring
them almost in line with those of the neighboring countries.
Investment Policies
To promote investment in general and to increase its role in
economic development, the government has encouraged private
sector investment. Agricultural investments are, compared to those in
other sectors, more likely to yield good returns. Legislative Decree
No. 10 of 1986 allowed the establishment of joint agricultural
companies, where the state (the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian
Reform) contributes 25% of the capital in the form of cultivated land
against 75% by the private sector. Several companies were licensed
under Decree 10, and some of them started production and export but
some achieved little success while others did not even start
production. The investment promotion law and its amendment:
Investment Law No. 10 of 1991 gave investors unprecedented
benefits, exceptions and exemptions in all sectors. It allowed the
establishment of industrial, agricultural, transport, tourism and other
projects with many advantages for all investors regardless of their
nationality. Decree 7 of 2000 amended some articles of Law 10
granting better incentives. In agriculture, it allowed land ownership
size according to the project needs (regardless of land reform
ceilings), and granted tax exemption of two more years (now seven
years) for projects that rely on advanced technologies or are set up in
remote parts of the country. At the beginning of 2007, new
investment legislation was adopted under Decree No. 8 and the
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Syrian Investment Agency was created under Decree No. 9 to offer
more facilities to encourage investment in all sectors, including
agriculture. The private sector investments licensed under Law 10 of
1991, and its amendments up till 2005 amounted to 120 projects with
a total value of nearly 31 billion SYP creating slightly more than
8,000 new jobs (Table 2.7).
Table 2.7 Private sector agricultural investments under Law 10 of 1991
(up to 2005)
Description No. projects Cost (bn. SYP) Jobs created
Agricultural
production and
irrigation
34 6,987 1,824
Livestock breeding
and fattening
86 24,003 6,208
Total agricultural
sector
120 30,990 8,032
Source: National Center for Agrarian Policies: Syrian Agriculture on
a Crossroads.
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Table 2.8 Government spending on agricultural investments during
2000-2005 (million SYP)
Project 2000 2005
Annual
growth
(%)
Total spend on agri-services 5,72
5
7,75
3
6.3
Afforestation and fruit trees
plantation
1,84
3
1,63
3
-2.4
Agricultural and animal
research
624 824 5.7
Development of animal
health
100 333 27.2
Animal improvement 114 86 -5.5
Agricultural extension
promotion
158 236 8.4
Support for general
pesticides
154 245 9.7
Arid areas projects 274 544 14.7
Forestation projects 849 1,76
3
15.7
Other service projects 1,60
9
1,86
7
3.0
Total agricultural production
investments
322 222 -7.2
General Establish. of Poultry 26 34 5.5
General Establish. of Cows 10 42 33.2
General Establish. of seed
propagation
47 34 -6.3
Other institutions 239 112 -14.1
Total public agricultural
sinvestment
6,04
7
7,97
5
5.7
Source: MAAR, Planning & Statistics Directorate.
Investment by the government aims to provide infrastructure and
services needed by agriculture; to undertake reclamation and
irrigation projects in order to increase the irrigated area (Ministry of
Irrigation); to conduct agricultural scientific research and undertake
support projects in areas like afforestation, plant protection,
extension and veterinary services (MAAR). Investments in
agriculture and irrigation sectors constitute 15-20% of total
government investments, which is less than the contribution of
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agriculture to GDP (around 24%). Government spending on MAAR
projects in 2000 amounted to 6,047 million SYP, of which 5,725
million SYP went to service projects and 322 million SYP to
production projects (state-owned enterprises). Such spending rose to
7,975 million SYP in 2005, a growth rate of 5.7% with 61 projects
financed (See Table 2.8 above).
Agricultural support services
The government is providing many services to the agricultural sector
with a view to developing this sector and increasing its efficiency.
The most important services provided during the period 2000–2005
are summarized in Table 2.9.
The Public Authority for Scientific Agricultural Research was
established under Law 42 of 2001 to conduct scientific research and
coordinate among all departments working in this area (ministry
directorates of agricultural research, the cotton office etc.). The
Authority now has a number of specialized departments working in
the areas of crops, horticulture, cotton, natural resources, socio-
economic studies, plant protection, animal wealth and financial,
managerial and professional affairs. The most important results
achieved recently include the introduction of 24 high-productivity
varieties of wheat, barley, lentil, cotton, maize, sorghum; and the
distribution of hundreds of genetically engineered animals especially
Awassi sheep and Shami goats with a view to improving the
productivity of animal wealth. Agricultural extension aims to transfer
knowledge and technology to farmers to develop livestock and plant
production. These government services are provided free of charge
through a network of around 1,200 extension units covering various
regions. With regard to the agricultural and technical education,
training and capacity building, there are five training centers in
different governorates. These centers organize training programmes
on priority agricultural issues and on technical development. There
are also a number of veterinary and agricultural institutes and schools
in various regions.
Syria's Agricultural Sector: Role, Challenges and Prospects  33
Table 2.9 Main intermediate goals of the support services (2000-2005)
Description Unit 2000 2004 2005
Scientific research
No. conducted
researches
Research 696 1,000 1,201
No. of generated
varieties
Variety 17 7 Na
No. of nucleus
delivered
 for seed
propagation
nucleus 22 2 Na
Area involved 1000
hectare
80 60 Na
No. of analyzed
samples (soil,
water and others)
1000 sample 47 36 36.6
Agricultural extension
No. of extension
units
Unit 883 1,071 1,200
Support to general pesticides
Treated areas 1000
hectare
1,495 2,440 1,426
Development of veterinarian care
Produced
vaccines
Million
dosages
162 228 320
Preventive
vaccination and
treatment
Million 84 53 40
Animal improvement
Artific pollination Thousand 708 883 895
Azotic fluid 1000 liter 482 463 486
Sperm 1000 cell 544 950 876
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Agricultural methods
Length of roads Km 1,741 933
Serviced area 1000 ha 148 95
Moved to
local
authorities
Reclamation projects
Tree planted
area
Hectare 22,141 19,715 20,584
Crop area Hectare 2,721 8,464 8,436
New forest roads Km 1,265 519 401
Source: MAAR, Planning & Statistics Directorate: MAAR
Achievements in 2004 and 2005 + Agricultural Development
Strategy.
MAAR is implementing a comprehensive programme to protect
crops against insects and diseases and reduce the consequent losses.
There is a follow-up system to implement treatments using the latest
available scientific information in order to maintain human health
and protect the environment. The Pesticide Committee assesses the
country’s need for pesticides, taking into account areas scheduled to
be cultivated. The government provides pesticides for compulsory
protection free of charge. The integrated pest management
programme has been adopted with a focus on biological control,
efficiently implemented on many agricultural products especially
citrus fruits, cotton, olives and apples, and will cover other crops.
Veterinary care, protection services of local breeds, medicines and
vaccines are provided by a network of veterinary clinics established
for this purpose. The private sector is allowed to provide local as
well as imported medicines and vaccines to protect animal health.
A special directorate of rural women was created to raise the
awareness of rural women, to enhance their role in improving
household income and their participation in the development of local
communities in general and agricultural development in particular.
Trade policies and trade agreements
Syrian trade policy before the 1990s was characterized by
government intervention in both domestic and foreign trade.
However, many amendments were made in this policy. Some
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restrictions have been removed: the private sector is now allowed to
import essential production inputs. Tariffs have been reconsidered
and the import burden on public foreign trade institutions has been
eased to encourage them to focus on exports. They are also allowed
to deal with the private sector and export at market prices. Public
institutions may now subcontract their export operations and have the
right to hold their export proceeds in foreign currencies.
Trade agreements have liberalized trade in agricultural products.
Syria has signed or ratified several bilateral agreements during recent
years with a view to strengthening regional integration. Free trade
agreements or agreements to facilitate investment and double
taxation were signed with Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Oman,
Saudi Arabia. Turkey, and Cyprus.
The Economic and Social Council of the Arab League adopted
this initiative to establish the GAFTA on 1 January 1998. The
relevant decision stipulated a 10-year period for the phasing out of
customs duties and procedures of similar impact on inter-Arab trade.
In 2002, the Council decided to accelerate the implementation of this
by ending the transitional stage in early 2005 when agricultural
quotas and customs duties were officially abolished. In addition, the
Arab summit in Tunisia decided the mandatory application of the
Arab standard specifications. The Arab Rules of Origin are currently
under development. Syria also joined the framework Convention on
Trade Preferences among the OIC member states based on
nondiscrimination and equal treatment and trade preferences
The EU-Syrian Association Agreement will be among the most
important agreements for Syria. With regard to agriculture, the
Association Agreement ensures preferential treatment for Syrian
agricultural production to facilitate its entry to the European markets.
This includes full or partial exemption from customs duties, granting
quotas for important products where Syria has surpluses, assistance
in enhancing its competitiveness in European markets and achieving
the required specifications. The EU shall also phase out tariffs on
agro industries so that they reach zero level at the end of the
transitional period. This will help the export of manufactured
products meeting the required specifications. The EU promised in a
WTO meeting to remove all forms of agricultural subsidies in 2013.
This will increase the entry chances for Syrian agricultural products,
which find it difficult to compete with the EU’s low–priced
subsidized products.
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Agricultural production
This section reviews the importance of agriculture to national
production and trade, and the impact of agricultural policies on
production. The annual and 5-year plans have prioritized the
development of agriculture and the growth of productivity.
Consequently, agricultural production has recorded positive
development in recent years, especially as a result of the relatively
high rainfalls levels (now, however, reversed with several years of
drought), the promotion of modern irrigation methods and the
provision of improved seeds. The following are the most important
developments in the agricultural sector:
Production and self-sufficiency
Agricultural and animal production has developed at varied growth
rates (table 2.10). Wheat production increased from 3,105,000 tons in
2000 to 4,669,000 tons in 2005; lentils from 73,000 tons to 154,000
tons; milk from 1,673,000 tons to 2,358,000 tons. In terms of growth
rates, wheat recorded 8.5%, lentils 16%, barley 29% and potatoes
4.6%, while other crops recorded negative growth rates such as
maize (-0.3), cotton (-1.1), and olives (-6.7) (Note that a good year of
production is often followed by a reduction in output the following
year.) Animal production has achieved positive growth rates during
the said period (7% for milk, 0.5% for red meat, 9% for poultry and
4% for chicken).
These positive developments helped achieve self-sufficiency in
many crops, especially strategic crops directly related to food
security, and in many animal products (See Table 2.11 on the self-
sufficiency rates of the most important agricultural products). For
example, self-sufficiency was achieved for wheat, legumes
(chickpea, lentil and others), cotton, and most vegetables and fruits
with self-sufficiency rates of 114% for wheat, 232% for lentils, and
146% for cotton in 2004. Meanwhile, there are shortages in some
other crops, where production does not cover the demand, such as
barley whose self-sufficiency fluctuates according to rainfall since its
cultivation is mostly rain-fed and in marginal areas; sugar where the
self-sufficiency rate ranges between 12% and 15% due to the lack of
irrigated areas to grow sugar beet; maize, imported as animal fodder
(especially for poultry), the production of which cannot be increased
because it requires excessively large amounts of water.
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Table 2.10 Main agricultural and animal products during 2000-2005
(1,000 ton)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Annual
growth
(%)
Wheat 3,105 4,745 4,775 4,913 4,537 4,669 8.5
Lentils 73 177 133 168 125 154 16.0
Gram 65 60 89 87 45 65 0.2
Barley 212 1,956 920 1,079 527 767 29.4
Maize 191 216 232 227 210 187 -0.3
Cotton 1,082 1,010 802 811 1,029 1,022 -1.1
Potato 485 453 513 487 542 608 4.6
Field
tomato
475 425 562 539 559 535 2.4
Olives 866 497 941 552 1,027 612 -6.7
Grapes 409 389 342 307 243 306 -5.6
Apple 287 263 216 307 358 296 0.6
Citrus 800 833 746 652 844 778 -0.6
Total
milk
1,673 1,578 1,765 1,878 2,129 2,358 7.09
Red
meat
236 216 173 207 216 242 0.55
Chicken
meat
107 116 125 161 172 163 8.92
Eggs
(mil)
2,546 2,671 3,321 3,449 4,002 3,104 4.04
Source: MAAR, Agricultural Statistical Abstract of 2005 issued by
the CBS.
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Table 2.11 Self-sufficiency of main crops (%)*
Description 2001 2002 2003 2004
Wheat 100 113 109 114
Barley 85 77 95 55
Lentil 121 136 169 232
Gram 91 92 103 192
Potato 100 100 96 99
Peanut 98 65 68 107
Maize 42 21 20 20
Cotton yarn 121 1,080 182 146
Sugar 16 14 13 12
Tobacco 103 104 103 106
Tomato 127 128 165 134
Dry onion 91 90 93 93
Garlic 101 78 95 89
Citrus 105 103 103 101
Aleppo peanut 135 99 97 106
Fresh grapes 108 108 103 104
Apple 107 108 105 109
Eggs 101 102 103 101
Fresh milk 96 96 88 100
Fish 89 55 56 56
Chicken 100 100 100 100
Washed wool 102 110 119 140
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Sheep meat 103 177 119 130
Beef 99 100 91 91
Goat meat 100 636 240 375
Total meat 102 149 113 122
Produced quantity
*% of self-sufficiency =
Quantity available for consumption
X 100
For animal products, the self-sufficiency rate would be good for meat
if the export of Awassi sheep (highly desirable abroad) was
paralleled with importing of less valued types of meat, keeping in
mind that increasing the production of Awassi meat is limited due to
the lack of grassland. For eggs and chicken, the self-sufficiency rate
is 100% or more. For dairy products, it is around 80% (this
percentage was calculated on the basis of the milk equivalent of
imported items such as cheese and butter).
Value of agricultural production/output and its contribution to the
national economy
The value of agricultural production at fixed prices of 2000 recorded
positive growth due to the considerable development in agricultural
production (farming and animal sectors). The agricultural GDP
increased from 337 billion SYP in 2000 to 452 billion SYP in 2005
(average annual growth of 1.6% (table 2.12). The value of vegetable
production rose from 215 billion SYP in 2000 to 288 billion SYP in
2005 (average growth rate of 6%). It accounts for 66% of agricultural
GDP. The value of animal production rose from 122 billion SYP in
2000 to 147 billion SYP in 2005 (average growth rate of 2.6%). It
accounts for 34% of agricultural GDP.
The value of agricultural production was 391.5 billion SYP in
2005 at production prices (table 2.13). Its contribution to the national
GDP ranged from 20% to 22%, thus ranking agriculture second
among the national economy sectors (after industry and mining,
including oil, whose contribution ranged between 36% and 40% of
the national GDP (table 2.14). The value of agricultural output (final
and semi-final products) at the fixed market prices of 2000 ranged
from 224 billion SYP in 2000 to 277 billion SYP in 2005, with an
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Table 2.14 Production structure by sector 2000-2005 (as measured in
fixed prices of 2000 (%)
Sector
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Agriculture 22 22 22 21 20 20
Industry & Mining 39 38 37 35 38 36
Building & construction 5 5 5 6 5 5
Wholesale/retail trade 10 11 12 12 13 12
Transport,
communications &
storage 11 12 12 12 9 12
Finance, insurance &
real estates 2 2 2 2 3 4
Social & personal
services 3 3 3 3 3 3
Civil services 7 7 7 8 8 8
Nonprofit organizations 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tariffs** 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: CBS * Preliminary estimates, ** added as of 2004
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Table 2.16 GDP structure by sector 2000-2005 in fixed market prices of
2000 (in %)
Sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Agriculture 25 25 26 25 23 24
Industry & Mining 30 29 26 24 27 24
Building & construction 3 3 3 4 3 3
Wholesale/retail trade 15 16 17 16 18 16
Transport,
communications &
storage
13 13 13 14 11 13
Finance, insurance &
real estates 4 3 3 4 4 5
Social & personal
services 2 2 3 3 2 3
Civil services 8 8 9 10 9 10
Nonprofit organizations 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tariffs** 0 0 0 0 2 2
Finance services** 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: CBS  * Preliminary estimates, ** added as of 2004
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Table 2.17 Per capita GDP and agricultural GDP 2000-2005 (SYP)
Description 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Annual
growth
rate (%)
Per capita GDP 55,389 56,833 58,753 57,984 60,746 62,943 4.3
Rural per
capita GDP
27,357 29,120 30,806 29,240 30,502 31,771 3.0
Source: Statistics Abstract, CBS
The importance of agriculture in trade
The value of total trade developed from 404 billion SYP in 2000 to
927 billion SYP in 2005 at an average annual growth rate of 18%.
Exports recorded a growth rate of 14%, while imports recorded 22%
(table 2.18). As a result of the big increase in imports, especially in
2004 and 2005, the trade balance turned from surplus before 2003 to
deficit in the last two years. The deficit was around 78 billion SYP in
2005. The value of agricultural trade rose from 75 billion SYP in
2000 to 127 billion SYP in 2005 at an annual growth rate of 11%.
However, its share of total trade decreased from 19% in 2000 to 14%
in 2005 (table 2.19). Agricultural imports evolved from 39 billion
SYP to 72 billion SYP during the years of comparison, at a growth
rate of 13%, but their share to total imports fell from 21% in 2000 to
14% in 2005. Agricultural exports evolved from 36 billion SYP to 56
billion SYP with a growth rate of 9%, but their share of total exports
fell from 17% in 2000 to 13% in 2005. However, the increase in
exports remains lower than that of imports, which increased the
agricultural trade deficit to 16 billion SYP in 2005 due to the
increased openness, especially toward Arab states and hence
increased imports, especially of sugar, rice and maize.
The European Union is Syria’s most important agricultural trade
partner (15% of total agricultural trade), but with Syria suffering
from a trade deficit of 537 million SYP. Saudi Arabia accounts for
5.9% with a surplus for Syria of 10 billion SYP, followed by Egypt
(9% and a surplus of 609 million SYP), the United States of America
(6.7%), Turkey and Argentina (6.5%) and the remaining countries
less than 4% (table 2.20).
Raw cotton and cotton yarn accounted for the lion’s share of
agricultural exports (22%), followed by live sheep (14%) and olive
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oil (8%). In general, the Syrian exports have low diversification; 10
commodities account for 60% of total agricultural exports As for
imports, maize had the highest share (12.4%), followed by sugar
(12%) and barley (7%). Like exports, imports have been
characterized by low diversification; the 10 first commodities formed
55% of total agricultural imports.
Syria has focused, since the launching of the five-year plans in
the early 1960s, on achieving the highest possible level of self-
sufficiency. However, with the 8th FYP, the concept of self-
sufficiency changed to food security, which focuses on producing
goods of relative advantage and exporting surpluses to provide
foreign exchange to cover the import of other goods that are not
produced locally or where the domestic production does not satisfy
the need.
In general, the per capita share of food commodities in Syria has
been acceptable in recent years and Syria occupies a high rank
among the developing countries; the average per capita calorie was
over 3,200 calories per day, of which 88% from plant sources and the
rest from animal sources. The per capita protein share is 87g/day,
68% of them from plant sources and the rest from animal sources;
113g of fat, 77% from plant sources and the rest from animal
sources. These are good food levels in general, but there is imbalance
between plant and animal sources. Given the above per capita share
of food and the population growth estimates (2.3%) and using some
of the indicators of future investments, we may conclude the
following projections for production and demand: Syrian agriculture
will, until 2015, continue satisfying the food needs with some
surpluses for export (crude or manufactured goods of basic crops in
particular: wheat, pulses, cotton, vegetables, fruit, olives and olive
oil, and an important part of the animal products). The deficit will
continue and even increase in some items, in particular: sugar, rice,
vegetable oils (except olive oil), tea and coffee and some livestock
products (table 2.21).
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Table 2.18 Syrian trade 2000-2005 (million SYP)
Value 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Annual
growth
rate
Total exports 216,190 243,148 315,919 265,039 346,166 424,300 14
Total imports 187,535 220,744 235,754 236,768 389,006 502,369 22
Trade Balance 28,655 22,404 80,165 28,271 -42,840 -78,069 -222
Total trade
value
403,723 463,894 551,673 501,807 735,172 926,669 18
Source: CBS
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Table 2.19 Syrian total and agricultural trade 2000-2005
(million SYP and %)
Syrian trade 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Annual
growth
Imports (million SYP)
Total trade 187,535 220,744 235,754 236,768 389,006 502,369 22
Agricultural
trade
38,813 40,810 48,098 50,505 64,683 72,174 13
% of agricultural
trade
21 18 20 21 17 14 -7
Exports (million SYP)
Total trade 216,190 243,148 315,919 265,039 346,166 424,300 14
Agricultural
trade
36,177 37,876 61,331 52,313 51,861 55,764 9
% of agricultural
trade
17 16 19 20 15 13 -5
Trade balance (million SYP)
Total trade 28,655 22,404 80,165 28,271 -42,840 -78,069 -222
Agricultural
trade
-2,636 -2,934 13,233 1,809 -12,822 -16,411 44
Trade volume
Total trade 403,725 463,892 551,673 501,807 735,172 926,669 18
Agricultural
trade
74,989 78,686 109,429 102,818 116,544 127,938 11
% of agricultural
trade
19 17 20 20 16 14 -6
Source: CBS + National Center for Agrarian Policies
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Table 2.20 Main trade partners by volume of agricultural transactions
in 2005 (million SYP)
Country Imports Exports
Trade
volume
Trade
balance
% of
total
trade
volume
EU 25 10,067 9,530.5 19,597.8 -536.7 15.3
Saudi
Arabia
1,031 11,160.0 12,191.3 10,128.7 9.5
Egypt 5,372 5,981.1 11,353.1 609.0 8.9
USA 8,085 437.8 8,522.4 -7,646.8 6.7
Turkey 2,804 4,360.0 7,163.6 1,556.5 5.6
Argentina 7,103 4.5 7,107.7 -7,098.6 5.6
Ukraine 5,004 111.0 5,114.7 -4,892.8 4.0
Lebanon 1,945 3,065.2 5,009.9 1,120.5 3.9
Iraq 776 4,043.5 4,819.1 3,267.9 3.8
Jordan 687 3,593.0 4,280.2 2,905.8 3.3
Brazil 3,694 202.9 3,897.3 -3,491.4 3.0
Sri Lanka 2,578 0.0 2,578.3 -2,578.3 2.0
Russia 2,354 117.7 2,471.6 -2,236.2 1.9
UAE 1,115 1,267.6 2,382.4 152.8 1.9
Malaysia 1,850 32.5 1,882.1 -1,817.0 1.5
China 868 696.1 1,564.1 -171.9 1.2
Kuwait 3 1,531.5 1,534.8 1,528.2 1.2
Thailand 940 438.2 1,377.7 -501.3 1.1
Sudan 599 690.3 1,289.6 90.9 1.0
Other
countries
15,300 8,500.1 23,800.0 -6,799.9 18.6
Total 72,174 55,763.5 127,937.6 -16,410.6 100.0
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Problems and challenges facing the agriculture and irrigation sectors
Agriculture is facing many internal and external challenges that
affect its performance and, consequently, sustainable development.
These include: limited natural and agricultural resources which are
susceptible to climatic and environmental factors; high population
growth and the lack of agricultural employment opportunities;
fragmented land tenures; limited financial resources as investors
refrain from investing in the agricultural sector because of the risk
factor and the long investment recovery period; multiple regulatory
authorities and poor coordination among them; changes in the world
economy (trade liberalization, free trade agreements); subsidies to
agricultural products in other countries and the high level of
competition; problems regarding macro policies that directly or
indirectly affect the agricultural sector (such as pricing, subsidization
policies and trade policies).
Strategies and plans to develop agriculture and improve food
security
Syria seeks to develop the agricultural sector in line with the concept
of a social market economy, that is, to further liberalize the sector
while protecting the interests of producers. Some of the highlights of
the Tenth Five-Year Plan strategies that illustrate this attempted
balance between the role of the state and the market are the
following:
• Major government investments will be made in the
modernization of irrigation, to improve the
management and use of irrigation water.
• Local private and foreign investment will be
encouraged in agricultural marketing and
manufacturing.
• All sectors including the private sector will be
allowed to provide production requirements while
tightening the monitoring role of the state to ensure
product specifications.
• Central pricing of strategic crops marketed by the
State will continue due to their importance for food
security or for export and to ensure farming of the
planned areas. Moreover, government will buy some
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new high-return crops at prices set to encourage their
cultivation.
• A viable subsidization programme will be developed
to enhance the competitiveness of agricultural
production and to avoid price distortion.
• The agriculture related administrative bodies have to
be reformed to enable them to fulfill their new
mandates in line with the new economic policy.
Necessary funding to implement the strategies
To implement the plan funds have been allocated to the Ministries of
Agriculture and Irrigation as indicated in table 2.22. Note: those
projects with no allocations depend on the ability of the state or
private sector to raise additional funding.
Conclusion
Syria’s agriculture has made major advances over the last decades.
However, high population growth on fixed land resources, continued
reliance on rainfall and the threat of growing water deficits underline
its continued vulnerability, as manifested in the drought of the end of
the 2000s. Attempts to deal with this and to adapt Syria’s agriculture
to the shift toward a greater market economy more open to the
outside without losing the gains achieved under the socialist system
will preoccupy agriculture decision-making for the near future.
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Table 2.22 Ministry of agriculture and Agrarian Reform:
projects with allocations in the 10
th
 FYP (million SYP)
MAAR (central
administration)
38,760
Public Authority for
Scientific Agricultural
Research
8,000
General Directorate for
Real Estate Services
2,000
Public Authority of Al
Ghab Development
Management
2,000
Ongoing projects
Organisations 1,630
Total 52,390
Fund for Modern Irrigation 22,000
Studies for new projects 7
New projects 8,178
New projects
Total 30,185
Grand total 82,575
New proposed
projects with no
allocations
MAAR 53,044
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Table 2.22 (cont.) Ministry of Irrigation: projects with allocations in the
10
th
 FYP (million SYP)
Public Authority for Water
Resources
7,570
Replacement and
renewal projects
Organisations 6,114
Ministry of Irrigation
(central Administration)
(completing the Ministry
premises)
100
Public Authority for Water
Resources
34,245.5
Ongoing projects
Organisations 35,384.5
Ministry of Irrigation
(central Administration)
37
Public Authority for Water
Resources
485New projects
General Establishment for
Land Reclamation
7,192
Grand total 91,128
Public Authority for Water
Resources
1,510.1
New proposed
projects with no
allocations General Establishment for
Land Reclamation
1,8002
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Table 2.22 (cont.) Total investment allocations in the 10
th
 FYP for MAAR
and Ministry of Irrigation (million SYP)
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
MAAR and affiliates 10,792 16,309 17,349 18,464 19,661 82,575
Ministry of Irrigation,
Public Authority for
Water Resources
and its organizations
12,924 17,884 19,726 20,011 20,583 91,128
Total 23,716 34,193 37,075 38,475 40,244 173,703
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Syrian Agriculture between Reality
and Potential
Munzer Khaddam
The paper of Atieh al-Hindi provides an outstanding description of
the different aspects of Syrian agriculture supported by ample data.
This paper focuses on certain aspects which merit more detailed
analysis and supplements al-Hindi’s paper with a view to assessing
the mechanisms and factors from which future predictions can be
made and development policies recommended.
Natural Resources
Land resources and their use
Land is the most important agricultural resource. We give below
information on land use based on corrected figures from the Syrian
Central Bureau of Statistics in Table 3.1. It shows that the total area
of agriculturally invested lands in Syria was 14,240 thousand
hectares (ha.) in 2005 (9,000 ha lower than 2002). About 5,950
thousand ha. is arable, of which 4,743 thousand ha. (33.38% of the
total) is actually cultivated. An area of 845 thousand ha. (12.20%) is
kept fallow to renew its fertility and 362 thousand ha. (6%) is not
cultivated. Pastures covers an area of 8,290 thousand ha., used for
sheep and cattle husbandry and form 58.21% of total invested land in
animal and plant production.
ff-artblankp  9/3/10  4:07 PM  Page 1
Syrian Agriculture between Reality and Potential  59
The above data clearly shows that renewing soil fertility relies
on leaving fields fallow despite the rapid development in chemical
fertilizer manufacturing: 14.2 % of the arable land (362,000 ha) was
kept fallow in 2006. This underutilization of land is aggravated by
the impact of population growth on land resources: the cultivated
land per capita decreased from 3.4 ha in the late 1940s to 2.2 ha in
the late 1960s, and has become 0.31 ha in 2006.
The high pressure on land resources due to high population
growth and increasing demand for food, raw materials, and agro-
industrial inputs makes intensive cultivation the only viable scenario.
This, in turn, requires capital to ensure the essential production
factors such as fertilizers, pesticides, technology and skilled labor,
not to mention water, a crucial factor in intensive cultivation, in
sufficient quantity and quality. The above table shows the contrary:
most of Syrian agriculture (more than 70% of arable lands) still relies
on rainfall, which fluctuates in amounts from one year to another.
Even the irrigated lands are not exploited properly; their usage index
(cropping area / physical area) is 102 percent. This means that the
physical area yields one main crop per year. In neighboring Jordan,
two main crops are cultivated per year and in Egypt two crops and a
short season intensive crop can be cultivated per year.
In the early 1950s, there was more than 8 million hectares of
arable land at the height of extensive expansion and although much
of this has been deliberately set aside for pasturage, we still now
have only 6 million ha. (25% less). One of the main causes is
improper irrigation (land flooding) that has led to soil salinity. It
seems the problem is recurrent and is still taking important areas out
of irrigated cultivation. Table 3.1 shows that the irrigated area
dropped 2.5% in just two years (from 1,439 thousand ha in 2004 to
1,402 thousand ha in 2006).
Irrigated areas in Syria can be doubled if financial resources are
provided, especially for irrigation systems. When the Euphrates dam
was built in late 1960s, it was expected to irrigate about 640
thousand ha. of arable lands in the arid third and fourth agricultural
settlement zones in Eastern Syria; three decades later only 60
thousand are irrigated given that the dam lake flooded about 20
thousand ha. of irrigated fertile lands. A significant amount of
Syria’s share in the Euphrates goes to Iraq (about 40 m3/sec out of
210 m3/sec, which is Syria’s share of the 500 m3/sec released by
Turkey). The Euphrates basin farmers use poor quality groundwater
instead of the Euphrates waters due to the lack of piping systems.
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Cropping Area in Syria
Cropping structure shows how lands are distributed among different
crops, thus defining the type of investment. Table 3.2 shows that the
irrigated area for winter crops and vegetables increased by 21.6%
from 2001 to 2006, while the irrigated area for summer crops and
vegetables declined by 7.29%. This is not understandable at first
glance, knowing that irrigated cultivation takes place in summer,
especially for vegetables, but in fact the variation was in non-
vegetable crops. Referring to 2006 statistics, a more detailed picture
can be drawn. Table 3.3 shows that cereal crops cover over 64% of
the total cultivated area in Syria (wheat 56.84%, barley 41.59%),
followed by fruit trees (18.44%) and industrial crops (with cotton on
top with 62%).
There is a wide possibility to change the current crop structure,
hence providing additional areas for industrial crops, fruit trees or
vegetables once economic resources become available to intensify
production. The hectare yield of wheat in irrigated lands was 4,404
kg. in 2006, while in rain-fed lands it was 1,397 kg. Similarly barley
yield was 2,198 kg and 868 kg respectively (see table 3.4). A simple
calculation will give us a picture of how much land can be spared for
other crops by simply changing from rain-fed cultivation to irrigated
cultivation. The required water can be provided, especially in the
northeastern regions where wheat and barley cultivation is prevalent,
as will be noted in the water resources section.
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Table 3.3 Land use of various cropping in 2006
Crop Area (‘000
hectare)
Percentage
%
Cereal 3,143.5 64.46
Legumes 267.4 5.48
Vegetables 162.3 3.33
Industrial crops 348.1 7.14
Forage crops 56 1.15
Fruit trees 899 18.44
Total* 4,876.3 100
Source: Author calculation according to tables 14/4,17/4,23/4,24/4
of the Agricultural Statistical Abstract of 2007(CBS, Damascus
2006)
*Differences in numbers are due to errors in data collection as a
result of numerous data collecting workers and bodies.
Table 3.4 Yields of some crops in Syria in 2006 (kg/ha)
Crop Irrigated
crop yield
Rain-fed
crop yield
Wheat 4,404 1,398
Barley 2,198 868
Broad Bean 2,380 1,284
Pea 2,957 985
Forage
barley
14,216 6,127
Corn 3,515 1,685
Cotton 3,180 -----
Tobacco 2,590 1,114
Tomato 49,401 5,121
Source: Agricultural Statistical Abstract of 2006.
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Holding Typology in Syria
Table 3.5 provides average holding sizes which have actually
declined. Small holdings are 70% of total Syrian holdings and
occupy only 22% of land area; medium holdings comprise 23 % on
57% of the land area while the large holdings amount to 7% on 20%
of the land area. The average small holding size in 2004 was around
2.85 hectares, whereas the average medium size holding was 22.51
hectares and the average large holding size more than 258.53
hectares.
Table 3.5 Number of holders and average holding area of arable lands
Year No. of holders Average holding
size (ha)
1970 527,899 11.05
1981* 485,501 7.59
1994 613,657 8.32
2004 660,371 9.01
Source: Statistical Abstract of 2007, table 5/4.
 * data of 1981 are inaccurate.
Small farms on which the farmer and his family members work
constitute more than 95% of total holdings in Syria. The area of the
holding is typically fragmented into pieces of different sizes in
different places. It allows little application of technology and thus
yields low productivity and has become an obstacle to the
development of Syrian agriculture. It is vulnerable to progressive
subdividing due to traditional inheritance practices. Generally
characterized by poor capabilities, small holdings cannot provide
fulltime work for farmers and their families throughout the year. The
utilization coefficient of work time in agriculture is 25% and for
agricultural engineers only 10%. The agricultural work time
utilization coefficient could be raised by integrating small holdings
into large modern farms, in the animal and plant production sectors,
food processing sector and handicrafts sector. In this regard,
cooperatives are a possible solution. The household economy should
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also be revived after being neglected for many years so that farming
families produce more of their own requirements. After the issuing of
the investment law No. 10 of 1991, several agricultural companies
were established in Syria, but two decades later these companies are
still meeting obstacles including the fact that they did not manage to
combine large farms in one location.
Water Resources in Syria
Water availability is crucial for sustainable development in countries
suffering from a water deficit such as Syria. In Syria, rains fall in
winter; the amount of rainfall fluctuates considerably from one year
to another and from one area to another. Syria is divided into five
rainfall zones with rainfall levels ranging between 30 and 55 billion
m3 annually, according to rainfall intensity. The average annual
rainfall is 46 billion m3, according to Ministry of Irrigation sources.
As Syria lies in the arid and semi-arid regions of the globe, most
rainwater is lost to evaporation. The annual water balance deficit (the
difference between precipitation and evaporation volume) is 2,400
mm in the eastern and southern parts of the country as a result of low
rainfall and evaporation. This deficit declines to 600 mm in the
northeastern areas in the period from November to late May and rises
to 1,600 mm in the same area from June to November. The deficit is
lower in the coastal areas and a surplus occurs in the western
mountainous areas.
Syria in endowed with several rivers, but the annual discharge
rate is low except for the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers. Flow rates
fluctuate from year to year according to rainfall. The average river
discharge in Syria is 33 billion m3 including the Euphrates, which is
shared with other countries. Hydrological and geological studies
show that groundwater aquifers prevail all over Syria; it is estimated
that the annual consumption ranges between 4.5 and 7.5 billion m3.
In addition to the traditional water resources, Syria has some non-
traditional resources, the most important being agricultural drainage
waters and sewage (waste water). Most of the cities’ waste water in
Syria becomes available for agricultural use once discharged into the
rivers. Agricultural drainage waters started to gain importance as
active efforts are made to construct canals and treat the discharge
water to be reused in irrigation.
In the last decade of the twentieth century, Syria launched a
promising attempt at rain-making through cloud seeding. The project
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is still in the development phase. The amount of manmade rainfall
during the rainy seasons of the last decade (December, January,
February and March) constituted 11% of annual precipitation. Table
3.6 gives an overview of the water resources in Syria.
Demand for Water in Syria
Demand for water varies with population growth and is concentrated
in the agricultural sector. The irrigated area in Syria amounted to
1,210.5 thousand ha in 2000, which consumed 12 billion m3 of water
with an average use of 10,000 m3 /ha/year.
Table 3.6 Water Resources in Syria during the period 1993-2003
(million m
3
)
 Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 1993 -
2003
(avg.)
Surface resources 1,823 2,359 2,943 4,806 3,019
Ground resources 4,239 4,613 4,859 6,464 5,008
Agricultural drainage
reuses
1,739 1,816 1,930 1,948 1,687
Industrial
wastewater reuses
1,117 1,165 1,214 1,258 1,021
Syria’s share of
Euphrates according
to the 500 m
3
/sec
standard (30758 m
m
3
)
6,567 6,567 6,567 6,567 6,567
Total water
resources
15,485 16.520 17,513 21,043 16,281
Evaporation from
surface waters
1,949 1,949 1,949 1,949 1,949
Total utilizable
waters
13,536 14,571 15,564 19,094 14,332
Resource rate of
change
100 107.65 114.98 141.06 105.88
Source: Author calculation based on Ministry of Irrigation data,
Water Resources Directorate, 2005
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Population growth and the decrease in agricultural land per
capita necessitate the expansion of the irrigated areas and increased
land/water unit productivity to meet agricultural demand and ensure
food security. Indeed, irrigated farming in Syria is in progressive
expansion; it has increased in 2004 to more than 1,430 thousand ha,
and an additional 1,135 thousand ha are expected to be added until
2020. By then demand on irrigation water will exceed 25 billion m3
based on the current usage; but theoretically this could be limited to
17.7 billion m3 if water usage/hectare decreased to 7,500 m3/ha/year.
Theoretically, this is achievable in areas with annual rainfall above
400 mm. Decreasing the water usage/hectare in other areas is not
possible unless traditional flooding is replaced by modern irrigation
techniques.
Domestic demand on water is also increasing as a result of
population growth and the rising living standards. Drinking water of
987 million m3 consumed in 2000 increased to 1,070 million m3 in
2005 according the Ministry of Housing and Utilities. Taking into
account other domestic water uses, demand for domestic water
amounts to 1,277.5 million m3. Industry consumed 237.8 million m3
of water in 1992, 480.9 million m3 in 2000 and 561 million m3 in
2005. Domestic and industrial use is expected to reach 4.12 billion
m3 in 2025. Table 3.7 illustrates the demand on water in Syria during
the period 1993-2003.
Table 3.7 Demand for water in Syria (1993-2003)
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003
1993 -
2003
(avg.)
Agriculture 13,188 13,683 14,410 14,669 13,001
Drinking 1,291 1,333 1,380 1,426 1,215
Industry 510 541 569 595 452
Total demand 14,989 15,557 16,359 16,690 14,667
Standard
number
100 103.78 109.14 111.35 97.85
Source: Author calculation based on Ministry of Irrigation data,
Water Resources Directorate, 2005.
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Water Deficit in Syria
The world’s standard of water poverty is 1,000 m3/person/year, while
in the arid and semi-arid area 500 m3 can be acceptable. A
comparison between availability and demand in Syria would give a
picture of the water balance and water security in this country as
shown in table 3.8. It shows that Syria, based on the balance between
availability and demand of water, suffers from a high deficit.
Water provision in Syria compared to world standards is in
deficit, although compared to standards for arid and semi-arid areas,
it is acceptable. According to this indicator, Syria’s water balance
will, however, suffer from a critical deficit by 2010, as a result of
population growth and the increasing demand on food; it will reach
highly critical levels in 2030 unless measures are adopted to develop
water resources and rationalize their uses. Several dams have been
constructed in the last decade to conserve surface waters and
organize water flow rates. There are more than 164 dams with a total
storage capacity of 18.6 billion m3, 13 billion m3 of which are in the
Euphrates dam.
Syria is trying to reach an agreement on a share of the Euphrates
and Tigris rivers with Turkey in accordance with international law.
Table 3.9 indicates that Turkey has discharged more water to Syria
via the Euphrates than the agreed quantity 500 cubic meters in the
1987 protocol. The average flow at Jarablos was 732.36 m3, an
increase of 232.36 m3. This can be attributed to the slow
implementation of Turkish irrigation projects and would not be
expected to continue after their completion.
It is worth noting that Syria does not actually use more than 174
m3/sec of its share in the Euphrates on average, which is 36 m3/sec
less than the agreed share in protocols and 25% less than the average
flow at Jarablos. The annual average flow into Iraq is 558 m3/security
(75% of the average flow at Jarablos), which is more than Iraq’s
share by 133 m3/sec. As such, Syria failed to use around 12.4 billion
m3 of water calculated according to the protocols signed with Turkey
and Iraq and around 46.2 billion m3 of water calculated according to
the total flow through Jarablos and the 42% share based on the 1991
protocol. Furthermore, Syria’s share of the Tigris River is 3-5 billion
m3 annually.
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There is large potential to increase Syria’s water supply through
rationalization by developing irrigation methods and reducing water
loss from distribution networks by increasing their efficiency.
Modern techniques such as sprinkler and drip irrigation should
replace the flooding method. Adopting such techniques would save
60% of the current water use, in addition to increasing production by
20-30%. Yet the area irrigated by modern techniques (sprinkler and
drip) is 2% of the total irrigated area, compared to more than 60% in
Jordan. During water transfer from source to fields huge losses are
incurred due to evaporation, transpiration and leakage. Several
studies have indicated that 20% of total water in open irrigation
canals is lost; using pipes instead would save around 15% of waters.
Water losses also take place in the field depending on the
irrigation method: the flood irrigation efficiency of 50% can be
raised to 60-70% by using sprinkler systems and to 80-85% by drip
irrigation. Domestic water networks also suffer from water loss;
according to the Ministry of Housing around 25% of the water
supply is lost from the household, municipal and industrial networks.
In-depth analysis of water rationalization cannot ignore factors such
as establishing the proper administrative and institutional authority
for water resources; improving databases and establishing monitoring
and follow up systems; and raising people’s awareness of water use
issues.
Review of the water sector from a future prospective
We can estimate the expected water gap by comparing expected
supply and demand (tables 3.10 and 3.11) and thus determine the
level of water security (table 3.12).
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Table 3.12 Water gap in the Syrian water balance in the targeted years
(million m
3
)
Item 2000 2010 2020 2030
1 12,464 12,464 12,464 12,464
2 na 15,774 15,774 15,774
Water
resources
3 na 14,608 14,608 14,608
* 14,851 20,576 22,720 27,063
** na 16,689 18,447 21,865
Gross
demand
*** na 14,098 15,446 17,761
1 -2,387 -8,112 -10,256 -14,599
2 na -915 -2,673 -6,091
Gross
water gap
3 na 510 -838 -3,153
Sources: Author calculation based on 1) the assumption that Syria’s
share is 6,567 million m
3
 based on the 42% standard and 500
m
3
/sec standard; 2) the assumption that Syria’s share is 9,695
million m
3
 based on the 42% standard and the actual flow rate
732m
3
/sec; 3) the assumption that Syria’s share according to
international law is 8,603.7 million m
3
 based on the 42% standard
and the 666m
3
/sec rate.
*, **,*** same as in Table 3.10.
A surplus in the Syrian water balance can be achieved until
2020 or beyond, in case Syria’s share of water flow from Turkey
increases from the actual water inflow from Turkey, of around 9,695
million m3; as well as Syria’s share in the Tigris River (around 5
billion m3 per year). In addition, another one billion m3 could be
conserved from coastal waters, water projects on Al-Yarmouk and
Southern Kabeir rivers and many other places. However, in the
longer run Syria’s water security cannot be ensured; Syria might
suffer from high water deficit that would only be compensated for
through regional cooperation, especially with Turkey.
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Animal Resources
Animal resources convert plant products to animal products of high
nutritional value for human use and allow exploiting the wide
pastures on the Syria steppe (al-Badia). Animal resources represent
35.8% of the total agricultural production.
Cattle numbers in Syria, which have increased since the
beginning of the century, amounted to 1,121 thousand head in 2006.
A marked increase in cattle numbers had occurred, calves increased
by 60.7%, dairy cows increased by 43.7% and the total number of
cattle increased by 34%.
Research indicates the potential to increase cattle numbers to 2
million head, especially dairy cows and fattening calves. However,
this necessitates further investment to improve fodder production and
husbandry conditions. Under the current situation, focus should be
given to husbandry condition improvement and providing proper
production services; and replacing the local low yielding breeds with
high yielding imported breeds or at least relying on the Shami breed,
which is highly adapted to environmental conditions and has high
productivity. The Shami breed comprises only 0.31 % of total dairy
cows, whereas local cows comprise 8.02%, imported cows form
8.31% and the remaining are improved local breeds constituting
83.36%. The average annual production of local cows is below 1,310
kg/year, while the average annual production of imported cows is
around 4,190 kg/year. A neighbouring country achieved an average
production of 5,000 kg of milk from its Shami herd whilst in Syria
Shami cow average production of milk does not exceed 2,020
kg/year. There are, thus, large potentials to increase dairy production;
in addition there is much potential to increase meat production,
which is currently only 60,305 tons.
Sheep in Syria are important to utilize the wide pastures in the
Syrian steppe (al-Badia). When rainfall is high in the steppe, pasture
improves, and sheep numbers increase. Sheep total numbers have
increased by 72.95% from 2000 to 2006, reaching 21 million. The
number of milk-producing ewes increased by 75.81%. Research
indicates that the herd could be increased to 30 million head, once
grazing in the steppe is organized and new forage plants, adaptable to
the steppe, are introduced. It is important to raise sheep under sheds
during winter (two or three months) and provide concentrated fodder,
which increases the lambing rate and ewes’ milk productivity.
Sheep production of milk and wool increased between 2001 and
2006 70.68% and 74.74% respectively as a result of increasing sheep
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numbers, while ewe production of milk or wool remained very low at
about 60 kg. However, research indicates that in the Awassi ewe, the
predominant breed in Syria, milk production can reach 700 kg/year.
The reliance on pastures to raise sheep in Syria restricts the options
to improve sheep production in terms of meat or wool; adopting
fixed husbandry in sheds during winter and fall months and using
hay fodders would increase both.
The contribution of poultry in the Syrian food basket in term of
meat and eggs made this sector a very important one, not to mention
the export potential. The poultry sector in Syria, driven by high
demand and the creation of modern farms, witnessed an increase by
46.51% during the studied period. Egg production increase ranked
the highest by 72.20%. Hen numbers have increased by 84%
Production of eggs in Syria amounted to 3,780 million eggs in 2006
and poultry production around 174,990 tons of meat. There is real
potential, based on research, to increase egg production to five billion
and meat production to 200 thousand tons through increasing the
number of broiler and layer modern farms, or through utilizing the
potential of the country’s household economy.
Agricultural Technology, Services and Financing
Syrian agriculture is well equipped with tractors and other
accessories such as ploughs of all kinds. Syria has a good position
among Arab countries in terms of the number of hectares per tractor
(43 ha/ tractor). The data also reveal that there are a significant
number of combines, sprayers, water pumps and dusting machines.
At the same time, Syrian agricultural lacks many other essential
types of machinery such as cotton picking machines, sugar beet
diggers, tobacco planters, and others. Cereal cultivation in Syria is
almost mechanized, wheat and barley cultivation is fully mechanized,
cotton cultivation is party mechanized (planting operations) as well
as sugar beet and corn cultivation. Vegetables, fruit trees and tobacco
cultivation are manually cultivated, except for plowing, tillage and
pesticides spraying. Obstacles to the further introduction of
agricultural technology include small holdings and the inability of
the non-agricultural sectors to absorb excess rural labour.
Syrian agriculture uses quite a lot of fertilizers, but still lags in
this domain. Fertilizer quota per area unit is low in comparison with
standard necessary amounts or actually used amounts in neighboring
countries. One hectare share of chemical fertilizers in 2006 was 148
kg of nitrogen, 130 kg of phosphor and only 4.33 kg of potash
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fertilizer according to the calculations. Although Syria has all the
inputs to develop its fertilizer industry, it imports 45% of the
fertilizers used in agriculture.
State intervention has developed toward more agricultural
liberalization during the last decade instead of centralized planning.
Increasingly, state policy can only intervene indirectly through
financial and economic tools (subsidization of inputs, defining prices
of crops purchased by the state, or providing credit with low
interest). However, there is no evidence that subsidization increases
agricultural production efficiency. As for crops purchased by the
state, it should adopt a direct contracting system with producers to
guarantee state purchases and provide, in exchange, some
agricultural inputs. The state could buy agricultural products’ surplus
in local markets or the quantities that could not be exported. Syria is
in real need of large private marketing companies that could open
new markets abroad for its agricultural products. Additionally, we
need marketing services to promote Syrian agricultural products and
reveal market trends in regards to these products.
The state has developed an infrastructure to provide agricultural
services; however, the 1,200 extension units across the country are
overstaffed with agricultural engineers, which can be misleadingly
taken as an indicator that extension services provided in Syria are
good. However, if we studied the volume of extension work provided
by these units in relation to the volume of those who need it, or the
actual work hours of extension work compared to official working
time, we would find that extension work in Syria is a cover for
masked unemployment.
The state-owned Agricultural and Cooperative Bank provides
credit in cash and in-kind with low subsidized interest rates.
However, the total credits provided to the agricultural sector have
decreased by 30% in the period 2001-2006. The highest decrease was
in medium term credits (-46.31%), then short term credits (-28.11%)
and finally the long term credits (-22.44%). There was also a
decrease in borrowers by 48% during the period 1995-2005
according to the bank’s data. What makes things worse is that around
85% of total credits given by the Agricultural Cooperative Bank are
operational ones, while the share of the actual development credits
did not exceed 2.35%. Agriculture cannot be developed without
investment credits. The private banking sector is not able to finance
agriculture, partly because it is new to Syria and partly because of the
high risks in agriculture.
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Agricultural Production in Syria
Syria is characterized by diverse natural and climatic conditions that
support agricultural production diversification. Indeed, there is a
relatively long list of crops grown, including cereals, legumes,
vegetables, fruit trees and forage crops. As a result of state efforts
during the last three decades, the output of these crops has increased.
Table 3.13 depicts the magnitude of fluctuation in agricultural
production from year to year due to different rainfall levels. For
example, production of barley in 2004 of 514 thousand ton increased
by 133.85% to 1,202 thousand ton in 2006. Wheat production
decreased by 32.87% between 2003 and 2004. This is true for most
of rainfed crops. Notwithstanding this, Syria has achieved a high
percentage of self-sufficiency of the main crops and improved its
food security.
Production Cost of the Main Agricultural Products
Table 3.14 indicates the cost of production, although the actual costs
are much higher since these figures neither include the cost of
irrigation water (only irrigation fees) nor the farm holder’s and his
family members’ wages. The fluctuation of cost from year to year
can be attributed to the fluctuation of inputs costs
Table 3.13 The development of main Syrian agricultural products
(in thousand ton)
Crop 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Wheat 4,775 4,913 4,537 4,669 4,931
Barley 920 1,079 517 767 1,202
Lentils 133 168 125 154 181
Chickpea 89 87 45 65 52
Broad beans 31 32 36 34 31
Corn 232 227 210 187 159
Sugar beet 1,523 1,205 1,218 1,096 1,438
Tobacco 26 26 26 29 25
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Cotton 802 811 1,029 1,022 686
Tomato 900 923 559 535 603
Potato 513 487 542 608 603
Dry onion 97 95 117 125 103
Water melon 480 674 812 588 562
Olive 941 552 1,027 612 1,191
Grapes 342 307 243 306 337
Fig 43 42 37 50 50
Apricot 101 105 76 66 98
Cherry 40 55 35 53 63
Pistachio 53 48 21 45 73
Apple 216 307 358 296 374
Sour lemon 85 71 112 111 119
Orange 427 399 495 453 554
Other citrus 234 182 237 214 234
Eggs (million) 3,321 3,425 4,002 3,104 3,781
Red meats 173.2 206. 9 216. 3 242.4 255.5
White meats 124.6 160.9 171.8 163. 4 175.0
Milk and its
products, of
which:
1,765 1,878 2,129 2,358 2,535
Fresh milk 582.3 553.7 662.0 765.3 824.9
Ghee 13.6 14. 4 16.1 16.9 17. 9
Butter 6. 0 5. 9 8.6 9. 6 10.7
Cheese 97.0 92.5 107.0 114.7 136. 8
Source: Agricultural Statistical Abstract of 2006, various tables.
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Table 3.14 Production Costs of Major Agricultural Products
(Syrian Pounds/Kg)
Item 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Irrigated
soft
1,027 1,073 999 950 936
Rain-fed
hard
923 928 869 881 834
Wheat
Irrigated
hard
1,064 1,104 1,024 985 979
Barley Rain-fed 929 1,024 877 853 786
Chickpea Rain-fed 2,160 2,224 2,054 2,082 2,149
Lentils Rain-fed 1,567 1,602 1,549 1,446 1,454
Corn Irrigated 1,348 1,419 999 894 1,007
Cotton Irrigated 2,620 2,673 2,576 298 2,684
Sugar
beet
Summer
crop
235 243 240 239 245
Fall crop 797 826 853 829 898
Summer
crop
829 810 839 871 865
Potato
Spring
crop
729 668 700 727 765
Average tomato cost 469 486 463 462 458
Olive Rain-fed --- --- --- --- 1,677
Grape Rain-fed ---- --- ---- ---- 678
Irrigated ----- --- ---- --- 155Apple
Rain-fed ----- ---- ---- ---- 1,555
Citrus ---- ---- --- --- 703
Source: Agricultural Statistical Abstract of 2006, various tables.
Costs and prices section
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Trade Balance of Agricultural Products in Syria
The trade balance reflects the food security level of Syria, that is,
how much it relies on imports from abroad. Table 3.15 shows the
amounts available for consumption, taking account of production,
imports and exports of major agricultural products, which generally
confirms a good level of food security in Syria up to 2005. Of course
it can improve greatly and Syria can achieve an export surplus.
Table 3.15 Main Agricultural Commodities' production, exports, imports
and amounts available for consumption (thousand ton)
Product 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Produced 4745 4775 4913 4537 4669
Import 24 74 265 143 188
Export 36 624 668 700 753
Wheat
Available 4733 4223 4510 3980 4104
Produced 1956 820 1079 527 767
Import 345 368 601 625 803
Export === 89 546 194 2
Barely
Available 2301 1199 1135 958 1568
Produced 177 133 168 125.3 153.7
Import 0.3 2 0.9 0.26 0.3
Export 31 38 70 71.4 74.8
Lentils
Available 146.3 97 99.6 54.16 79.2
Produced 216 232 226.7 210 187
Import 296 899 914.2 856 147.4
Export === === === === ===
Corn
Available 512 1131 1140.9 1066 1661
Potato Produced 453 513 486.6 542 608.5
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Import 11 16 36.8 22 44.2
Export 12 17 16.9 17 23.9
Available 452 512 506.5 547 628.8
Produced 772 900 845.8 965.4 957.3
Import 4 14 5.1 14.7 74
Export 168 210 217.9 260.3 321.7
Tomato
Available 608 704 733 719.8 709.3
Produced 353 281 283.8 360 357.6
Import === === === === ====
Export 187 255 127.6 114 156.3
Ginned
cotton
Available 166.3 26 156.2 246 201.3
Produced 497 941 552.2 1027 612
Import === === === === ===
Export 0 === 0.6 0.5 5
Olive
Available 497 941 551.6 1026.5 607
Produced 389 342 307.3 243 306.3
Import 0 === === 0.5 0.8
Export 30 25 13 9 13
Fresh
grape
Available 359 317 297.3 234.5 294.1
Produced 263 216 306.7 385 296
Import 0 === === ==== ===
Export 18 16 13.9 28 68.5
Apple
Available 245 200 292.7 330 227.5
Produced 833 746 652.5 844 777.8Citrus
Import 7 9 12 19.6 19.6
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Export 45 29 28.9 27.8 53.5
Available 795 726 635.6 834.8 743.9
Produced 1578 1765 1875 2129 765.3
Import 9 --- --- --- 0
Export 11 14 --- --- 0.3
Milk
Available 1576 1751 1878 2129 765.1
Produced 2671 3321 3449 4602 3104
Import --- ---- ---- ---- ----
Export 15 10 107 48 20.4
Egg
(million)
Available 2656 3311 3342 3954 3083.
6
Produced 216 173 206.7 216.1 242.3
Import 0.9 0.7 6.6 5.8 4.2
Export 5.2 6.3 30.3 44.8 54.5
Red
meats
Available 212.3 115.7 182.8 177.1 192
Produced 116 125 161 171.8 163.4
Import --- ---- ---- ---- ----
Export ----- ---- ----- ---- ----
Poultry
meats
Available 116 125 161 171.8 163.4
Source: Agricultural Statistical Abstract of 2006, 157/10-1.
Conclusion
Despite considerable progress in the development of Syrian
agriculture, its potential has not been fully utilized. There is
considerable scope for improvement in land and water use, animal
breeding and the delivery of technology to the sector. Such
improvements are necessary if Syria is to maintain food security with
population increase and to develop its export capacity.
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Agrarian Counter-Reform in Syria
(2000-2010)
Myriam Ababsa
Introduction
In 2008, as the price of cereals doubled across the world leading to
hunger riots in Egypt (April 2008), Syria’s policy of food self-
sufficiency pursued since the Ba’athist revolution of 1963 appeared
vindicated. Syria had the most thriving agriculture of the Middle
East. It was highly subsidised and accounted for up to one third of
the Gross Domestic Product and employing up to a third of the
working population. It enabled almost half of the nation’s inhabitants
to stay in the countryside, especially in the North East of the country,
the Jazira,1 which is the source of two thirds of cereal and cotton
production, partly thanks to irrigated zones developed as part of the
State Euphrates Project. However this achievement was in question
after three consecutive dry years (2008-2010), in which Syria had to
receive international food aid for nearly one million persons, its
emergency cereals reserves were exhausted and tens of thousands of
peasants fled to main city suburbs in search of informal work. Its
agricultural work force may have dropped from 1.4 million to
800,000 workers in this period (Aita 2010). Some believe this is also
linked to the dismantlement of Syria’s socialist agriculture.
The bulk of agricultural production in Syria is in the private
sector which was restructured during the land reforms of 1958, 1963
and 1966, with small peasants organized in service cooperatives. The
public sector, which consists of state farms and production
cooperatives created during the land reforms and the implementation
of major national irrigation projects, never fulfilled its economic and
ideological objectives of social transformation of the rural
population. The process of economic liberalization which President
Bashar al-Assad embarked upon in July 2000 has therefore taken on
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a radical form in the domain of public agriculture: that of the
distribution of land in state farms and the renting out of undistributed
land confiscated during the land reforms.
Between December 2000 and December 2001, the Syrian Ba’th
party promulgated a series of political decisions (taqarir) that aimed
at privatising the state farms in Syria. The main one, decision number
83 of 16 December 2000, put an end to 43 years of collectivist
experiments in the field of land reform, including 38 years under the
aegis of the Ba`th party. Thodr reforms had established state farms
and, more generally, aimed at the replacement of the traditional tribal
social allegiances with new allegiances to the state. Now under
decision 83, the land was parcelled out in shares of 3 ha. for irrigated
land and 8 ha. for non-irrigated land. It formally allocated “right of
use,” and not property. It called for land to be distributed to, in order
of priority, to the former owners, the farm workers, and employees of
the General Administration of the Euphrates Basin (GADEB). In the
Jazira, the decision triggered considerable tension and competition
among these three categories, as each feared being excluded from the
land redistribution process. As implementation proceeded, more than
250 complaint letters were addressed to the Syrian President’s office
and a peasant revolt took place in the village of Disbi Afnan in
December 2002. Nevertheless, the reform and its consequences have
failed to attract broader attention, and were hardly mentioned in the
economic columns of Syria’s daily press.
Decision 83—and the move towards privatisation that it
represents—should be seen against a broader backdrop of controlled
economic liberalisation (infitah) underway in Syria since the early
1990s. This paper explores the impact of the decision on agrarian
structures and the social hierarchies in the Syrian Jazira. I suggest
that, to a greater degree than the liberalization process announced in
1991, this land reform has marked the end of the socialist ideology of
the Ba’th Party. However, this was paralleled by a renewal of
clientelist political practices. I show that it constitutes a case of
counter-revolution, analogous to that in Egypt (Bush 2002).2
State Farms in Syria and the Euphrates Project in al-Jazira
State farms were created in Syria as a result of successive land
reform laws in 1958, 1963 and 1966. These laws offered the state the
opportunity to rationally manage agricultural resources that had been
previously ’plundered’ by absentee landowners. When the land
reform was completed in 1970, 1,513,000 hectares had been
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expropriated by the state, including 443,000 ha that had been handed
over to private individual peasants, 338,000 ha distributed
collectively to peasants in cooperatives, 38,000 ha sold and 140,000
ha reserved for the state farms. Notably, 351,400 hectares in arid
areas were not distributed. 306,000 ha of this arid land were located
in Jazira. Here, it was decided that the population was insufficient to
allow for meaningful re-distribution (Hinnebusch 1989: 96). 
Formerly a pastoral area located between the Tigris and the
Euphrates, at the borders of the Bilad ash-Sham, for half a century,
the Jazira has been the pioneering agricultural and energy site of
Syria. The great Euphrates and Khabour Project was implemented
here in the seventies, and the main national hydrocarbon reserves
have been exploited here since 1985. This strategic zone, half of
whose population are Kurds, has been heavily controlled by
successive Ba’athist regimes, which have relied on medium-sized
land owners from the semi-nomadic tribes of the valleys of the
Euphrates, the Balikh and the Khabour in order to carry out their
development objectives. We shall study the process of agrarian
counter reform underway in the heart of this zone.
Latifundia and the implementation of land reforms in the Jazira
(1958-1970)
The Jazira underwent a boom at the end of the 19th century, due to
the Ottoman policy of land endowment of Bedouin chiefs and the
settling of the Euphrates semi-nomadic tribes. This policy was
continued during the French Mandate with relative success, though
this zone was divided between Syria, Turkey and Iraq in 1920. Vast
landed estates formed in the Syrian Jazira controlled by Bedouin
Sheikhs, by the chiefs of the Euphrates tribes who had registered
collective lands in their names, and lastly by the inhabitants of Raqqa
(Raqqawi) and Deir ez-Zor (Deiri) who offered usurious loans to the
modest tribal land owners and confiscated their lands when
repayments were not made (Hannoyer 1982; Ababsa 2002). In 1951,
90 % of Jazira agricultural land was owned by forty Bedouin chiefs
and town notables. Ten of them, including the Najjar and Asfar
families and the sheikh of the Shammar, Dahham al-Hadi, owned
70 % of the irrigated land of the Euphrates (Khader 1975: 66).
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Table 4.1 Land ownership structure in Jazira and the Euphrates, 1945
Euphrates Jazira
Properties < 10 ha 15%, 178,000 ha  5%, 56,000 ha
Properties 10 to 100 ha 32%, 286,000 ha 52% 528,000 ha
Properties > 100 ha 28%, 246,000 ha 34% 343,000 ha
State Properties 25%, 224,000 ha  9%, 96,000 ha
Source: Service technique du cadastre et d’amélioration foncière,
1945, in Khader 1984: 189.
The Jazira’s first economic boom came about at the initiative of
Aleppo merchants (khanji) at the time of the cotton boom in the
fifties. 13,000 motor-driven pumps were installed along the
Euphrates by entrepreneurs from Aleppo, Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, to
irrigate the upper terraces of the Euphrates. Irrigation without
draining the land and monoculture led to the impoverishment of this
new agricultural land within a decade. Yet, at the same time, middle-
sized shawi owners grew extremely rich. They began to question the
domination of the old Sheikhs (Khalaf 1981). New figures emerged
within tribes, especially middle-sized land owners who subscribed to
the Ba`ath Party from 1963 onwards.
Although the “pillaging” of the Jazira during the fifties was
stigmatised by the theoreticians of the land reform of 1958, this
reform was only partially implemented in the North-East of Syria.
This limited application in the main zone of Syria’s latifundia was
due to technical obstacles – the absence of a land register, lack of
staff and the division of land between heirs – as well as political
reasons. From 1963, the Ba’athist regimes adopted a pragmatic
policy towards the Jazira which consisted in promoting the
emergence of a class of middle-sized tribal landowners who were
loyal supporters of the Party, while allowing the great “feudal
landowners” to keep the basis of their wealth. Thus, an amendment
to the land reform law was enforced in 1966, protecting recently
irrigated lands from expropriation. This amendment was inspired by
neo-Ba’athist militants from Deir ez-Zor, who were small and
middle-sized landowners, anxious to oppose the cities’ middle
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classes, counting not on the peasantry, but on their kind, other
middle-sized landowners (Petran 1972: 183). Their aim was to
control a region which was 92 % rural and 96 % of whose inhabitants
were illiterate, and to create favourable conditions for the
implementation of the great Euphrates and Khabour Projects.
At the end of the land reforms, less than a fifth of the arable
lands of the Raqqa governorate, i.e. 18.5 %, and 14.5 % of those of
the Deir ez-Zor governorate were expropriated. Only one third of the
fertile lands located in the Euphrates valley were affected by the land
reform. As for the remaining two-thirds, either their ownership was
relatively egalitarian (with farms below the 1963 55 hectare
ownership limit), or most often their Sheikhs were sufficiently
influential to deter the distribution committee from intervening
(Bauer 1990: 10). As for the bigger landowners of Raqqa (with over
20 irrigated hectares or 80 unirrigated hectares), although they
counted for only 5 % of landowners, they still owned 37 % of the
land of the governorate, while the 83 % of small-scale landowners
(with fewer than 8 irrigated hectares or 30 unirrigated hectares)
shared 40 % of land (Hinnebusch 1989: 234). A quarter of Raqqa’s
farming families received no land. In the middle valley of the
Euphrates, large-scale landowners managed to retain up to 55
hectares of the most fertile land, located all along the valley, while
leaving the semi-arid plateau lands to be distributed.
The land reform was accompanied by an important law
concerning agrarian relations (law no. 134 of 1958 amended by
decree 218 of 1963). For the first time, contracts between owners and
tenants had to be in writing and automatically renewed, even in the
event of the sale of the land. According to this law, farmers who only
worked the land, without providing seeds or fertilizers, should gain at
least 25 % of irrigated cotton harvests, 33 % of irrigated vegetable
harvests, 40 % of unirrigated vegetable harvests, 30 % of fruit
harvests and 25 % of olive harvests.3 The 1958 law restricted the
share of the owners of power-driven pumps to 40 % of the harvest,
the peasant farmer receiving at least 40 % and the landowner 20 %.
The application of the law on land relations allowed peasants to
benefit from a significant increase in income. In the Raqqa
governorate, the average share of crops which went to the peasant
farmer rose by 20 to 30 % to reach almost 43 % (Khalaf 1981: 339).
This enrichment was the prelude to a significant transformation of
social relations in the Syrian countryside, as a result of the reduction
of farmers’ debts owed to landowners. Moreover, tenant farmers had
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the opportunity to obtain new forms of credit, outside the context of
feudal landowners.
The Euphrates Project and the Creation of State Farms
Along with the implementation of the agrarian reforms, state farms
were established in the sixties. They were conceived as “avant-
garde” structures to train farm labourers with modern techniques of
production and to diffuse the Ba’th socialist ideological principles.
Each state farm constituted a model village where farm labourers
were paid and governed by a "council of production" (Hannoyer
1985: 32). Standard acreage ranged from 100-155 ha in Deir ez Zor
and Aleppo, to 14,000 ha in Raqqa, and to 36,000 ha in the northern
Jazira city of Qamishli. The state farms quickly became associated
with low productivity and heavy production costs. In 1972, nine out
of fifteen farms lost money, and milk production cost two and half
times the retail price (Hinnebusch 1989). At the beginning of the
1980’s, 72,000 ha. of state farm land were distributed to peasants
(Hinnebusch 1989: 118).
Nevertheless, new state farms were created in the frame work of
the state irrigation projects. The most important of these was the
Euphrates Project, which attracted a quarter of the national budget
during twenty years. It was conceived to create a new agro-industrial
sector and an abundant electric power supply. More than half a
million hectares of new irrigated areas were planned that included
450,000 ha to be reclaimed from the steppe and improvements to
160,000 ha already irrigated land (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). The
Euphrates Project was as much a political as an economic project. It
was to assist in establishing the new socialist order that was to
substitute for the tribal structures dominant in the Jazira and facilitate
political control of a long insubordinate area. Fifteen Pilot Project
farms and villages were created as part of the Euphrates Project in
Raqqa Governorate. From a social point of view, engineers and
workers acquired new skills as they were engaged in the substantial
projects of dam-building and the construction of the new city of
Thawra, the administrative centre of the project.
The fifteen state farms of the Euphrates Pilot Project were built
on lands expropriated by the state in the barriya, a zone of pasture
and dry culture. Most of its land belonged to members of the
Hleissat, a formerly semi-nomadic tribe that settled near Raqqa in the
1940s. 2,396 land owners of steppe areas north of Raqqa, between
the Euphrates and the Balikh, were expropriated of 19,255 ha. They
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received a small indemnity of 2,000 to 5,000 SYP, according to the
lost surface, plus a compensation of 100 SYP per donum (1/10th
hectare), which was supposed to cover the lost income for each
donum.4 The Pilot Project was then launched on these expropriated
surfaces.
Figure 4.1 Irrigation Projects in Syria
Source: Ababsa 2004, Hinnebusch 1989.
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Table 4.2 State farms' surfaces evolution (1970-2000)
Year State farms
total surface
Cultivated surface
1970 138,000 ha 64,132 ha
1983 67,666 ha 10,378 ha
2000 68,146 ha 21,011 ha
Source: Hinnebusch 1989: 203 and GADEB, 2001, Teshreen, 2002.
Figure 4.2 Localisation of the 15 state farms of the Pilot Project in the
Euphrates Valley on a Google Earth image
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The State General Administration for Land was created in 1986
within the Ministry of Agriculture to administer nine big projects
(m u n c h a a t ) and five agricultural units, throughout nine
governorates.5 It administrated 114,040 ha, of which 62,188 ha were
exploited. Only 19,855 ha were irrigated: 3,731 ha by wells and the
rest by canals. In 2004, 6,307 permanent workers and around 10,000
temporary workers were employed there (Teshreen, 1 September
2004). In the north-eastern governorates of Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir ez
Zor and Hassaka state farms covered 68,146 hectares of which
21,011 ha were irrigated land in the Pilot Euphrates Project. A
further 45,862 hectares were uncultivable lands that were also
included in the state farms in 2002 (Teshreen article, 23 June 2003).
The failure of the Pilot Project State farms
The Pilot Project along the Balikh River was carried out relatively
quickly. Between 1972 and 1973, the cement channels and the
pumping station for 20,000 ha were installed. 24,000 ha were
scheduled, but because of soil salinisation and the collapse of the
main channels built on gypsum, only 9,000 ha were still exploited in
the mid-1980s (Hannoyer 1985: 32). Between 1976 and 1985, 4,000
ha of arable lands became salified per annum (Hannoyer 1985: 29).
At the beginning of the 1980s, 20,000 ha of fields irrigated but not
drained were salified and unsuitable for agriculture, and 35,000 ha
had lost half of their productivity because of salt formation
(Hinnebusch 1989: 236).
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Table 4.3 Implementation percentage of the Euphrates Project
(1973-1986)
Zone Surface
announced
(ha)
Surface
cultivated
(ha)
Implementation
(%)
Balikh 186,000 34,000 18.4 %
Middle
Euphrate
165,000 27,000 16.4 %
Rassafa 25,000 0 0
Mayadin 40,000 0 0
Meskene Alep 155,000 21,000 13.5 %
Lower Khabur 70,000 0 0
Total 640,000 82,000 12.8 %
       Source: GADEB statistics YOUNIS 1992: 168.
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Table 4.4 Population, housing and services in the Pilot Project’s fifteen
state farms in 1996
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Andalous 2,561 1,255 1,306 330 10 6 5
Rachid 3,120 1,529 1,591 404 12 2 3
ANSAR 4,960 2,420 2,540 636 10 8 5
Yarab 3,104 1,521 1,583 497 10 6 3
‘Adnanya 4,159 2,038 2,121 516 10 8 5
QAHTANIA 4,119 2,018 2,101 514 12 8 5
Rabi’a 4,048 1,981 2,065 500 12 8 5
Hittîn 3,759 1,842 1,917 466 10 6 5
Assad 6,127 3,002 3,125 468 16 12 5
Badr 3,344 1,639 1,705 408 10 6 5
Qadissiya 3,200 1,568 1,632 396 10 6 5
MUDAR 2,640 1,293 1,347 336 14 6 5
Mohamdia 3,040 1,490 1,550 390 10 6 3
Ghassania 2,561 1,255 1,306 340 10 6 5
Yamana 2,800 1,372 1,428 356 10 6 5
Total 6,768 166 104 69
    Source: internal data from the GADEB, Raqqa, 1997.
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The creation of Lake Assad in 1973 submerged 66 villages and 126
hamlets located on fertile lands in the Euphrates banks. Sixty
thousand people from the al-Walda, a semi-nomadic tribe, had to be
moved. The Euphrates Dam Ministry created 15 state farms for the
displaced in the Pilot Project and 42 colonization villages at the
Turkish border, in the Kurdish area of Hassaka governorate to form
an “Arab belt” among the Kurds.
Only 9 % of the 60,000 al-Walda people whose villages were
submerged by the Assad Lake agreed to be reinstalled in the Pilot
Project (Meyer, 1990). The displaced people who joined the farms
obtained an average of 3,3 ha of land in private property as a
compensation for lost lands. But as experts of the United Nations
noted, this allocation was insufficient. In order to realize one of the
social objectives of the project—namely the destruction of tribal
relations—the displaced were dispersed over several farms. Thus in
the farm of Rabi`a, 260 families were installed that originated from
67 different places - half of them from areas submerged by the lake
(55 %) (Hinnebusch, 1989).
About half of the workers from the Pilot Project farms left them
between 1976 and 1986. Population declined from 39,200 to 20,100
people during this time. That was due to the low productivity of the
lands, which quickly became salinified because of inefficient
drainage. The workers went to Raqqa to find daily employment in the
building sector. To stop the exodus of workers, more lands were
allocated to them in private property in the project of Bir Hachem in
1986 while marketing was organized by a cooperative. The six farms
built between 1983 and 1986 in Bir Hachem offered improved
housing for the peasants. Each village counted 400 families, that is to
say 2,400 people, for whom the services were improved. In Bir
Hachem Project, 10,000 hectares were cultivated at the end of the
1980s.
Evidence suggests that state farms produced little benefit for the
farmers and failed equally in their ideological role of peasant
indoctrination. From the beginning production costs were higher than
revenue. Thus, in 1980, the income of the GADEB farms was 25
million SYP whereas the production costs were 50 million
(Hinnebusch 1989: 241; Hannoyer 1985: 33). In July 2001, an
internal GADEB document assessed production in the whole
Euphrates Project. The results, highlighted in table 4.4, offer an
explanation for why the government decided to put an end to the
farms. In 2000, the benefit of all the state farms and the projects of
Euphrates managed by the GADEB were 25.5 million SYP, whereas
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the production costs reached on the 645 million SYP: they had been
multiplied by 13 in twenty years! Meanwhile, the number of
temporary workers was hardly reduced between 1999 and 2000, in
spite of low production and a rumor that the state farms would be
closed (table 4.5). The situation was especially bad within the
General Administration of State Farms, where income dropped from
177.8 million SYP in 1990 to 87.8 million SYP in 1995, further to
36.3 million SYP in 2000 and finally to 10.8 million SYP in 2003
(Teshreen, 1 September 2004).
Table 4.5 Production cost and incomes in the Euphrates Basin Projects
(1999-2000, in ‘000 SYP)
Project Name Total
production
Production
expenses
Salaries Total
expenses
Incomes
or
deficits
All Projects 645,821 300,267 297,358 620,271  25,550
Pilot Project :
Cultures
Milk farm
Bovine farm
540,811
485,792
38,535
16,484
241,326
190,468
35,830
15,028
246,938
230,248
11,882
4,808
504,720
436,881
47,953
19,886
36,091
48,911
-9 418
-3 402
Meskene West* 4,922 1,798 1,906 3,704 1 218
Experiment
Center
2,238 1,736 4,574 6,345 - 4 107
Middle
Euphrates
66,381 31,024 33,182 68,306 - 1,925
Bir Hachem 31,469 24,383 10,758 37,196 - 5,727
Source: Syrian Irrigation Ministry, GADEB, May 2001.
* Meskene is divided into two zones, Western Meskene and
Eastern Meskene. Both are located in Aleppo Mohafazat, with an
extension in Raqqa Mohafazat, especially the Bassal Assad farm,
created in 1994.
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In the face of the evidence indicating the failure of the state farms,
the government was forced to act within the framework of its
“Campaign against Corruption.” It is in the context of economic
opening (infitah) accelerated after 1991, and especially after the
death of the President Hafez al-Asad in June 2000, that the decision
to distribute the lands of the state farms was adopted in 2000.
Decision Number 83 (16 December 2000) on the Distribution of
State Farms
With the beginning of the economic opening in 1991 (infitah), the
Syrian state launched a renewal of private economic initiative. At the
same time it also insisted that some sectors be protected from
liberalization for political reasons. In 1992, a new production system
was introduced in the state farms. This allowed the use of hiring
contracts, which gave 20 % of the production to those who signed
one. A new category of land-holders thus appeared alongside farm
labourers and the various engineers and technicians: that of the
holders of an exploitation contract (mucharikin).
The legislative principles of decision 83, 2000
Ten years of economic liberalization, severe decline in agricultural
production, and extensive corruption in the state farms led to the
privatisation of all Syrian state lands by decision 83, 2000. Critically,
this decision was taken by the executive rather than by the
legislature; indeed, it was not a ministerial decree, nor a law, but a
political decision of the Ba`th Party, which was then transmitted to
the Agriculture Ministry and to the Irrigation Ministry (and the
GADEB). The provisions of the decree include the following:
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Figure 4.3 Extracts from Taqrir 83 – December 16, 2000 (Ba`th Party):
"The State farms General Administration Land Distribution"
1. - Cancellation of the property status of the lands which were
expropriated but not cultivated after this.
2. - Distribution of the exploited lands by lots of 3 ha (irrigated) and
8 ha (not irrigated, ba`l) by family according to the following order of
priority:
- former owners and agrarian reform beneficiaries (malik wa
muntafi`);
- the holders of a contract who live in the farms, then those who do
not;
- the farm labourers who live in the farms, then those who do not;
- the agricultural technicians who worked in a permanent way in the
state farms.
3. - Sale of the state farms’ housing to those who occupy them and
who obtained lands. Furthermore, the sale of the production tools
and materials with priority to the agricultural cooperatives by
payment in several installments, and finally the sale of the sheep
herds.
4. - The Agriculture and Irrigation Ministries keep what they need in
terms of housing and agricultural tools, 10% of the agricultural
surface, the irrigation networks, and the cattle farms entrusted to
the general administration.
Source: Extracts of the Official text, obtained in Raqqa, October
2003.
Decision 83 was not accompanied by the cancellation of the
preceding decrees (1971 and Decree 1033, 1983)6 which related to
the distribution of ownership. This led to confusion as to the rights of
the former owners, the agrarian reform recipients, the workers and
the technicians. Many employees tried to obtain rights to the property
based on some contracts dating back to before 16 December 2000.
For these, strict measures were adopted by the Commission of
Distribution: any agricultural engineer present at his working station
at the time of the publication of the decision, who could have left it
for various reasons, but who again occupied it at the date of April 3,
2003, had the right to obtain land plots. On the other hand, any
temporary worker having had a contract for the agricultural seasons
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of 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 had the right to obtain lands, but not
those employed in the previous seasons. Any farm labourer having
worked at least 180 days during 2000 could claim lands, but not
those having worked the previous years.
While the Pilot Project involved the management of public
property, the redistribution of the lands to the citizens was by
privatisation - although the term does not appear officially. This
process of privatisation was strongly criticised by some GADEB
communist employees I met in Raqqa. As one of them recalled it,
decision 83 had been taken without any preliminary study on the
consequences of such a redistribution for the Pilot Project, nor on the
property structures. In this context of legal inaccuracy and conflict
between administrations, many owners, recipients and heirs started to
assert their rights to the land, and many complaint letters were sent to
Damascus, addressed to the President of the Republic.
Petitions of former landowners and their parliamentary intermediaries
In this vague legal context, many landowners, beneficiaries and heirs
began to claim land rights. Three types of petitions (shakwa)
appeared: those from former landowners contesting the fact that they
only received 3 irrigated hectares at the most and 8 unirrigated
hectares (ard ba`l) out of all the lands they had formerly owned;
those from heirs whose names had not been recorded; and finally
those from landowners who saw their former lands distributed to
government officials, through “fake” contracts.
Concerning the farms of the Euphrates Project, the most active
group of protesters was formed by the heirs of former landowners
and beneficiaries of the land reforms. Their first petition was
received by the governor of Raqqa on 13 January 2001. The heirs
were classified into several categories depending on the date of death
of the legatee. Heirs of a legatee deceased before decision 244 of
1972 concerning the creation of state farms of the Pilot Project were
divided into two categories: those whose names were recorded in the
land registers and who had obtained up to 3 hectares each, and those
whose names were not registered and who had to share one collective
3 hectare plot. If the legatee deceased after decision 244 of 1972, the
heirs collectively obtained only 30 donums,7 unless they had
personally registered themselves under their names. However, in this
case the cost of personal land registry was higher than the value of
the land.
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Several deputies from the Raqqa governorate raised the problem
of discrepancy between decision 83 and the inheritance law. In June
2005, deputy Mohammed Faysal al-Howeidi, chief Sheikh of the
`Afadla tribe who has sat in parliament since 1994, gave me a copy
of his file of complaints. This file shows the rivalries between the
different Syrian administrations, particularly between the Ministry of
Agriculture and Land Reform, the Ministry of Irrigation, the GADEB
and the Agriculture Department of the Raqqa governorate. Deputy al-
Howeidi preferred not to present his petition in his own name as a
wronged large-scale landowner. Instead, he passed his request on to
the Deputy of Raqqa, Nadua Salum. Nadua Salum, a member of the
Ba`ath Party, did not contest decision 83. However, she stressed the
need to apply article 825 of the Civil Code and article 260 of the
personal law concerning inheritance.
In her first letter, dated March 2004, to Prime Minister Naji al
Otri, deputy Nadua Salum emphasized that the GADEB Committee
in charge of the distribution of state lands had not recognized the
rights of all heirs, but only of those whose names were registered in
1972, the date of the creation of state farms. This was a real problem,
she added, insofar as many landowners had passed away without
having registered the names of their heirs. She called for the
government to apply the inheritance law which does not oblige an
heir to be registered as such in order to inherit. She took the
following example: “A family which owned 380 hectares before the
creation of state farms only received 3 hectares even though it had
14 legal heirs,” which means that they should have received 42
hectares. Thus Nadua Salum echoed the lobby of landowners by
asking of the Prime Minister that the Committee of Distribution takes
into account the year 1985, when the ownership of state farms was
transferred (naql al mulkiya) to the GADEB. Choosing this later date
would make a greater number of heirs eligible for distribution. She
sent copies of the letter to the Minister of Agriculture and Land
Reform, to the Minister of Irrigation as well as to Parliament.
In response to Deputy Nadua Salum’s letter, in April 2004 the
Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Adel Safir, made an official request to
the Agriculture Department of the Raqqa governorate for a report on
the inheritance law for the lands of the Pilot Project. On 7 April
2004, in his turn, the Minister of Irrigation sent a very precise letter
to the Committee for Distribution of the GADEB, recommending the
application of the two articles of law which safeguard inheritance
rights : article 260 of personal law, which states that “the heir
inherits at the death of his parent or by legal decision”, and article
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825 of the Civil Code which states “the heir inherits without having
to be registered”.
In June 2004, Deputy Nadua Salum sent a second letter to the
Minister of Irrigation again requesting to consider the application of
the inheritance law of 1985 rather than 1972. In September 2004,
The Department of Agriculture of the Raqqa governorate finally
replied to her requests. According to the Department of Agriculture,
the lands of state farms were transferred to the GADEB in 1972, by
decision 244 of the Ba`th Party. The names of the landowners and of
their heirs were registered, and could have been changed until 1985,
when ownership was transferred to a sole owner: the GADEB. In
1985, the number of landowners was 166, and the number of heirs,
registered or not, reached 2,000.
These issues concerning inheritance have still not been resolved
in 2008. However, the Committee for Distribution of GADEB land
was dissolved in January 2005, following several scandals
concerning the attribution of lands to individuals unrelated to the
various administrative services of the Raqqa governorate. Tensions
are high in the villages where “fake” beneficiaries cultivate unjustly
obtained lands. On 15 December 2002, the day of the farmers’
festival, the governor of Raqqa, the general secretary of Raqqa’s
Ba`ath Party as well as the head of the Department of Agriculture,
were invited to the village of Dibsi Afnan (which was rebuilt after
having been flooded by the dam’s lake), and bore the brunt of the
population’s anger. Attacked by tens of farmers shouting “corruption
sucks the lifeblood from farmers!” they had to seek refuge in their
cars under a volley of stones. On the same day, fifteen demonstrators
were arrested and transferred to Raqqa. 500 farmers’ families from
Dibsi Afnan protested for several months against the renting out of
their lands, which had been confiscated by the state in the early
seventies, to people from outside their village. A young man from
Dibsi Afnan was even killed during a brawl with the newcomers. In
2003, President Bashar al-Assad ordered an investigation committee
which partly restored the wronged farmers’ rights.
Decree no. 4 of 2005 and the sale of state farm housing
On 18 January 2005 decree no. 4 was promulgated, officially putting
an end to the General Administration of State Farms as well as to the
Pilot Project, despite the latter depending on the General
Administration of the Euphrates Basin, which was not dismantled.
Under the decree, employees of the General Administration of the
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State Farms henceforth come under the control of the Ministry of
Agriculture, which continues to pay for their contracts until their
retirement; 10 % of lands and agricultural tools passed on to the
ministry; and the housing was sold “at current prices” to the
beneficiaries of land distribution transactions underway following
decision no. 83 of 2000 (Teshreen, 19 January 2005).
A new type of petitioner then appeared: those occupants of the
state farms who were neither employees of the General
Administration of State Farms nor of GADEB. Over the years,
because of the poor levels of farm productivity and the exodus of
workers to the towns of Aleppo and Raqqa, state farm housing had
been rented out and sub-let following various procedures. Whilst the
beneficiaries of decision 83 of 2000 could purchase their housing for
10,000 SYP per flat and 15,000 SYP per house; the tenants of State
farm housing, who paid a token rent of 15 SYP per month henceforth
had to pay an amount equivalent to 9 % of their salary (i.e. 300 to
450 SYP) without the right to purchase their accommodation.
Decree 4 of 18 January 2005 ratified this situation despite the
questions raised since 2002 by non-beneficiary residents of state
farms, especially by 1,071 residents of the Assad Project in Meskene
in the Aleppo governorate, who are neither civil servants nor farm
labourers. Their first petition dates back to February 2002, when they
asked for the right to purchase their accommodation (Teshreen, 26
March 2005). In response, a special committee for housing was
created within the Ministry of Agriculture in October 2003. Deputy
Ahmed Munir Mohamed raised the question in front of parliament in
autumn 2003. On 8 July 2004, the head office of the Assad Project
asked the Aleppo governor for permission to grant all farm occupants
the right to buy their accommodation (Teshreen, 25 June 2005).
Nevertheless, decree 4 of 2005 was promulgated with complete
disregard for previous parliamentary debates.
The issue of the rights of non-civil servant farm residents has
become particularly tricky. It also arises in the farms of the Pilot
Project of the Raqqa governorate where a third of the working
resident heads of households (36.4 %) are not employed by the state.
In 2005, out of 3,507 resident heads of households in the fifteen
farms of the Pilot Project, 717 were employed by the GADEB, 830
were musharikin, 684 civil servants of various state services, and
1,276 were not employed by the state.8
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The distribution of State Farm Land of the Euphrates Project
“All about the first stage of the distribution of lands of the Pilot-
Project.
Everyone is talking about it in Raqqa because the distribution
concerns almost 6,000 beneficiaries, i.e. 36,000 people allowing for
six members per family, which gives an idea of the economic and
social importance of this major distribution in the region"
(Al Thawra Newspaper, 5 February 2002).
The distribution of Syrian state farms
The bulk of the distributions took place within the Pilot Project of the
Raqqa governorate and the large Bassal al-Assad farm of Meskene in
the Aleppo governorate. On 1 September 2005, 26,470 hectares of
the Assad farm in Meskene (of which 15,625 hectares are irrigated)
were shared out between 4,297 beneficiaries (3,168 of whom were
labourers), but only 3,600 of them took their plots (i.e. 10,574
hectares), since 697 had not reported to the distribution committee
(Teshreen, 1 September 2005). The other half of the distributions
took place within the Pilot Project of the Raqqa governorate, where
my field investigations were carried out.
The implementation of Decision 83 of 2000 in the Euphrates
Pilot Project proceeded in five stages, until June 2005. The
first, from October 2001 to March 2002, affected the landowners and
beneficiaries of the land reform, as well as employees and contract
farm labourers. The second stage, from April to October 2002,
benefited GADEB staff with at least three years’ service. The third
stage, from October 2002 to September 2003, concerned those who
could give proof of having worked for GADEB for one year. The
fourth stage, which began in September 2003, allowed all civil
servants from the GADEB who wished to retire to obtain a three
hectare plot on top of their allowance. This last measure aimed at
reducing the workforce of the GADEB whose main duties were
henceforth to provide water at a set price and to stipulate crop types
which comply with the agricultural plan. The last stage of
distribution, underway since 2004, allows all civil servants of Raqqa
governorate to receive a plot of land if they resign voluntarily.
By August 2003, 2,392 landowners and beneficiaries of the land
reform had benefited from the first stage of distribution; followed by
1,379 holders of contracts to farm land (musharikin); and finally
1,067 labourers and contract staff employed under various categories
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by the GADEB. On 31 May 2005, there were an additional 5,614
beneficiaries. Half of them were former landowners and beneficiaries
of the land reform, one third were agricultural labourers holding a
lease contract (musharikin), and the remainder were temporary
labourers and civil servants. Note that 1,086 female civil servants
were also allocated land, at the request of the governor who sent a
note in this regard to the Minister of Agriculture (653 employees of
the Pilot Project, 253 employees of the administration other than the
Ministry of Irrigation, the others being employed in the Euphrates
Basin). The highest uncertainty persists regarding the authenticity of
their contracts.
The increase in agricultural incomes
Despite the many protests regarding the legal principles and the
terms of implementation of Decree 83, most people are nevertheless
agreed about the economic legitimacy of such a measure which aims
to re-create a real bond between farmers and the land they cultivate.
Every civil servant I met, including communist activists as well as
the beneficiaries, acknowledge that the decree has at least allowed
the recovery of a satisfactory level of productivity in the older farms.
According to the head of the Department of Agriculture of Raqqa
governorate, one of the direct positive consequences of the
dismantling of farms has been the five-fold increase in revenue from
total agricultural production of Raqqa governorate between 2000 and
2003 (from 400,000 million SYP in 2000 to two billion SYP in
2003).9
Moreover, according to the head of the committee for land
distribution of state farms, interviewed in October 2004, the
beneficiaries of Decision 83 have doubled their annual income. Thus,
a civil servant whose monthly salary used to be 5,000 SYP/month,
i.e. 72,000 SYP/year, managed to earn between 130,000 and 170,000
SYP during the year 2003-2004.10 However these calculations are
very optimistic and only concern good years for agriculture. Indeed,
yields of wheat, cotton and barley vary depending on soil quality,
irrigation techniques and annual climatic conditions (winter frosts,
and extreme summer drought). Yields fluctuate; for wheat between
300 and 550 kilos per donum (kg/d) and for cotton between 200 and
450 or even 500 kg/d. For example, 2003 was a very good year for
agriculture, wheat yields were 550 kg/d, compared to 450 kg/d in
2004. Meanwhile cotton yields were nearly 500 kg/d in 2003, then
fell to 300 kg/d in 2004. In 2005, the state guaranteed all producers,
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private and public, purchase prices of 13,000 SYP per ton of wheat,
27,000 to 29,000 SYP per ton of cotton, and 7,000 SYP per ton of
barley (see table 4.6). If the beneficiary does not cultivate but rent his
land, his income was reduced by a third. In that case, the labourer
had a salary of 250 SYP/year per donum and 35 % of the production.
The labourer’s wife and children are working for free on the plot. He
must pay up to 35 % of the fertilizers and up to 20 % of the farm
machinery rental. The owner pays for the water, provides the seeds,
and pays the remaining 65 % of the fertilizer cost and 80 % of the
tractor.11
Table 4.6 Agricultural income from a 30 irrigated donum lot in the
Euphrates Project
  2003 (excellent year)
cotton             wheat
   2004 (normal year)
cotton             wheat
Yield (kg/donum) 500 550 300 400
Sell price (£/ton) 29,000 13,000 27,000 13,000
Expenditures (£/30
donum)
100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000
Annual income
(£/30 donum)
- for the exploitant
- for the renter of
the plot
- for the labourer of
the plot
335,000
217,750
117,250
114,500
74,425
40,075
143,000
92,950
50,050
56,000
36,400
19,600
Source: Interviews in Raqqa, June 2005.
Land resale and latifundia recreation by Euphrates tribal contractors
As explained, the state farms’ reform created many family conflicts
between the recorded heirs who gained land and the non-recorded.
There were also conflicts however, between those who received bad
plots and those who gained better land. Moreover, the reform led to
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an extreme land parceling and a property scattering (most of the
recipients obtained plots far from their former and existing
properties). As a consequence, an internal "rationalisation" process is
taking place by plot sale or exchange.
Following the parcelling out of the lands and their distribution,
many recipients now either rent or sell their plots. In case of land
rental, the current price is 1,500 to 2,000 SYP per donom. For a 30
donom plot, such a rental produces an income of 45,000 to 60,000
SYP per annum, which corresponds to the average wages of
employees. In case of land sale, the current price is 15,000 to 30,000
SYP per donom, which is three to ten times lower than the wider
land market: a donom costs along the river Balikh, between 50,000
and 80,000 SYP and along the Euphrates between 100,000 and
400,000 SYP for the best land, located near Raqqa. The sale price is
low because such sales are illegal; still, a recipient who sells his/her
thirty irrigated donoms can still hope to gain from 450,000 to
900,000 SYP on the black market. That is six to twelve years of
average wages.
As the sale or rental of the state farms’ plots are both illegal, the
contracts are confidential and engage only private individuals. The
denunciation risk weighs on the land recipient and not on the man
who rents or buys it. I have tried to uncover the identities of new
large landholders in this process, but it is a difficult subject to broach
in interviews. I did, however, learn that a majority of the recipients
do not exploit their lands directly, but rent or sell them; and that the
largest "purchasers" are currently members of the Euphrates tribes, in
particular that of the Hleissat, who are specialized in sheep sale.
Some Hleissat sheikhs confirmed this analysis in October 2004: "Of
course the Hleissat are the ones who buy this land: because it is their
land! We, the former owner, received only 30 donoms out of
thousands of donoms we had. We do everything to get our land back.
Why did not the government simply give us our land back?." As a
Ba`th activist reminded me, this former big owner should thank the
government that gave him back some land, for, in most of the case,
big ownership was built illegally in Jazira. During the 1950s, many
tribe chiefs registered in their name common tribal properties, and
many Raqqawî urban landowner took land from indebted peasants.
Furthermore, one must keep in mind that the agrarian reform was not
fully implemented in the Jazira: in 1970 it had concerned only a third
of latifundia (Khader, 1984).
A double process results from the sale and rental movements of
the Pilot Project fields. On the one hand, there is a reinforcement of
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large contractor capacities, mainly members of the Euphrates tribes
but also Raqqawî, who have the means to rent and exploit large
surfaces, and that were able to keep their properties during the
agrarian reform by giving it to their heirs. On the other hand, there is
the renewal of large latifundia, which exceed all property ceilings
fixed by the successive land reform laws. These contractors have
access to low cost Euphrates water through the Euphrates Project
canals. Thus, the change in the property structures and nature of
exploitation is radical. It passed from state farms to large private
domains, that the Ba`th Party theorists had wished to limit above all.
It is indeed a form of counter-revolution (Bush 2002).
Conclusion
The political decision 83 of December 16, 2000 completely upset the
land structures which prevailed in the Euphrates Basin since the land
reforms and the creation of the Pilot Project State Farms in 1972.
5,600 people received lands from the former Pilot Project’s fifteen
farms. Half of them were former owners or land reform recipients; a
third were sharecroppers with exploitation contracts and a fifth were
workers and GADEB employees. An intense phenomenon of land
rental took place through which the former employees received the
equivalent of the pay they had lost. In parallel, large land contractors
grew rich at high speed. They even managed to acquire land at low
prices (three times cheaper than market prices) and without
respecting property ownership ceilings. The state farms’ privatisation
process constitutes an unexpected counter-revolution. Indeed, the
primary beneficiaries of the “reform” process are not the traditional
rural constituents of the Ba’th party, but a re-emergent class of
latifundists tied to the central state and traditional power structures.
                                               
1 The band of land between the Tigris and the Euphrates.
2 Fieldwork was conducted in Raqqa in September and December 2003,
with a grant received from the Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies, as a winner
of the 2002 Middle East Research Competition. Interviews with employees and
land owners made in Raqqa in October 2004, June 2005 and April 2007 helped
me to update the data. This work is part of my Ph D in Geography entitled
“Ideologies and territories in a pionnier front: Raqqa and the Euphrates
Project in the Syrian Jazîra”, 2004), Best Doctoral Dissertation Prize, 2006
(runner-up), Syrian Studies Association.
3 During the Ba’athist revolution, the limits were raised in favour of the
farmer, who could obtain 40 % of irrigated cotton crops, 50 % of irrigated
vegetable crops and 30 % of olive crops.
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4 Interview with a GADEB communist agricultural engineer in Raqqa,
October 2003.
5 These big projects are: 8th March Project in Rif Damascus; Hurriya
Project in Lattaquia; Assad and Abu Firas Hamdani Projects in Aleppo
governorate; Rachîd Project in Raqqa governorate; Si`lo Project in Deir ez-Zor
and Ras al-Ain Project, Manajir and Tiger in Hassaka governorate. The five
agricultural units are located in Quneitra, Deraa, Suweida and Hassaka
governorates.
6 Decree 1033 limited the private property in the State Irrigation Projects to
160 donums. 3,100 hectares were expropriated and transformed to state land
rented for 75 SYP a donum a year (Bauer 1990: 38).
7 One donum = 0.1 hectare or 1,000m2.
8 See Ministry of Irrigation, Statistics of the General Administration of the
Euphrates Basin, 2005.
9 The governorate of Raqqa produces on average 500,000 tonnes of wheat
(on 189,000 ha), 120,000 tonnes of barley (299,000 ha), 240,000 tonnes of
cotton (52,000 ha), and 64,000 tonnes of corn (14,000 ha).
10 The interviewee took the case of a beneficiary who was cultivating 15
donums of wheat and 15 donums of cotton. The 15 donums of wheat can
produce 8 tonnes (i.e. 75 sacks, « joual », weighing 110 to 120 kg), given that a
ton of wheat sells on average for 12,000 SYP, that makes a total production of
100,000 SYP. This calculation assumes a high yield of 5 sacks of wheat per
donum, i.e. 600 kg. As for cotton, one donum can produce between 300 and 400
kg, so 15 irrigated donums can produce between 4.5 and 6 tonnes of cotton.
Banking on a sale price of 2,900 SYP per 100 kg, a sum of 130,500 to 174,000
SYP is reached. 100,000 SYP must be deducted to cover the purchase of seeds
and fertilizers, as well as the rent for farm machinery (Seeds cost 15 SYP/kg
and in this case 500 kg are needed for 15 donums. Fertilizers cost 8 SYP/kg and
50 kg are needed per donum). Altogether, once production expenses are
deducted from the agricultural revenue, the beneficiary can earn an annual
income of 130,500 to 174,000 SYP, i.e. double his previous salary.
11. According to other calculations in the Euphrates Valley I received, an
irrigated donum produces an income around 20,000 SYP in a good year
(600,000 SYP for the assumed 30 donum example). Regarding the non-irrigated
ba`l land, the income depends on the level of precipitations. Near Ain `Issa, in
the northern part of the governorate (350 mm per year) a donum can produce
15,000 SYP/year, but around Raqqa only between 2,000 and 8,000 SYP/year,
according to the year’s rainfall and the soil.
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